# Navy rd 3 v Gonzaga BJ

## Off Case

### 1NC K

#### The affirmatives political methodology for addressing conflict is founded in stereotypes of fear, producing inaccurate scholarship.

Kaldor 13, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, “In Defence of New Wars,” March 7, 2013, Stability, 2(1): 4, pp. 1-16, <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/download/sta.at/40%E2%80%8E>

The most common criticism of the ‘new wars’ argument is that new wars are not new. It is argued that the Cold War clouded our ability to analyse ‘small wars’ or ‘low-intensity wars’, that many of the characteristics of new wars associated with weak states can be found in the early modern period and that phenomena like banditry, mass rape, forced population displacement, or atrocities against civilians all have a long history. Of course this is true. Many of the features of new wars can be found in earlier wars. Of course the dominance of the East-West conflict obscured other types of conflict. But there is an important reason, which is neglected by the preoccupation with empirical claims, for insisting on the adjective ‘new’. Critics of the ‘new wars’ thesis often concede that what is useful about the analysis of ‘new wars’ is the policy implication of the argument. But this is precisely the point. The term ‘new’ is a way to exclude ‘old’ assumptions about the nature of war and to provide the basis for a novel research methodology. The aim of describing the conflicts of the 1990’s as ‘new’ is to change the way scholars investigate these conflicts and thus to change the way policy-makers and policy- shapers perceive these conflicts. Dominant understandings of these conflicts that under pin policy are of two kinds. On the one hand, there is a tendency to impose a stereotyped version of war, drawn from the experience of the last two centuries in Europe, in which war consists of a conflict between two warring parties, generally states or proto-states with legitimate interests, what I call ‘Old Wars’. This term refers to a stylised form of war rather than to all earlier wars. In such wars, the solution is either negotiation or victory by one side and outside intervention takes the form of either traditional peace, keeping in which the peace-keepers are supposed to guarantee a negotiated agreement and the ruling principles are consent, neutrality and impartiality - or traditional war-fighting on one side or the other, as in Korea or the Gulf War. On the other hand, where policy-makers recognise the short comings of the stereotypical understanding, there is a tendency to treat these wars as anarchy, barbarism, ancient rivalries, where the best policy response is containment, i.e. protecting the borders of the West from this malady. The use of the term ‘new’ is a way of demonstrating that neither of these approaches are appropriate, that these are wars with their own logic but a logic that is different from ‘old wars’ and which therefore dictates a very different research strategy and a different policy response. In other words, the ‘new wars’ thesis is both about the changing character of organised violence and about developing a way of understanding, interpreting and explaining the interrelated characteristics of such violence. As Jacob Mundy (2011) puts it, in one of the more thoughtful contributions to the debate: ‘Whether we choose to reject, embrace or reformulate concepts such as.... new wars, our justifications should not be based on claims of alleged coherence with particular representations of history Rather such concepts should be judged in terms of their ability to address the very phenomena they seek to ameliorate’. Even so, it can be argued that there are some genuinely new elements of contemporary conflicts. Indeed, it would be odd if there were not. The main new elements have to do with globalisation and technology. First of all, the increase in the destructiveness and accuracy of all forms of military technology has made symmetrical war, war between similarly armed opponents, increasingly destructive and therefore difficult to win. The first Gulf war between Iraq and Iran was perhaps the most recent example of symmetrical war a war, much like the First World War, that lasted for years and killed millions of young men, for almost no political result. Hence, tactics in the new wars necessarily have to deal with this reality. Secondly, new forms of communications (information technology, television and radio, cheap air travel) have had a range of implications. Even though most contemporary conflicts are very local, global connections are much more extensive, including criminal networks, Diaspora links, as well as the presence of international agencies, NGOS, and journalists. The ability to mobilise around both exclusivist causes and human rights causes has been speeded up by new communications. Communications are also increasingly a tool of war, making it easier, for example, to spread fear and panic than in earlier periods hence, spectacular acts of terrorism. This does not mean, as Berdal (2011) suggests, that the argument implies that all contemporary wars involve global connections or that those connections are necessarily regressive. Rather, it is an element in theorising the logic of new wars. Thirdly, even though it may be the case that, as globalisation theorists argue, globalisation has not led to the demise of the state but rather its transformation, it is important to delineate the different ways in which states are changing. Perhaps the most important aspect of state transformation is the changing role of the state in relation to organised violence. On the one hand, the monopoly of violence is eroded from above, as some states are increasingly embedded in a set of international rules and institutions. On the other hand, the monopoly of violence is eroded from below as other states become weaker under the impact of globalisation. There is, it can be argued, a big difference between the sort of privatised wars that characterised the pre-modern period and the ‘new wars’ which come after the modern period and are about disintegration. These new elements are not the reason for the adjective ‘new’, however, even though they may help to explain the evolution of new wars. The point of the adjective ‘new’ does not have to do with any particular feature of contemporary conflicts nor how well it resembles our assumptions about reality, but rather it has to do with the model of war and how the model I spell out is different from the prevailing models that underpin both policy and scholarship. It is a model that entails a specific political, economic and military logic.

#### Recreation of these stereotypes entrenches the existing power structure ensuring globalized war and structural violence

Kaldor 99, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance a the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, New & Old Wars, 1999, Stanford University Press, pg 110-111

The new wars have political goals. The aim is political mobilization on the basis of identity. The military strategy for achieving this aim is population displacement and destabilization so as to get rid of those whose identity is different and to foment hatred and fear. Nevertheless, this divisive and exclusive form of politics cannot be disentangled from its economic basis. The various political/military factions plunder the assets of ordinary people as well as the remnants of the state and cream off external assist ance destined for the victims, in a way that is only possible in conditions of war or near war. In other words, war provides a legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources. While this predatory set of social relationships is most prevalent in the war zones, it aLso characterizes the surrounding regions. Because participation in the war is relatively low (in Bosnia, only 6.5 per cent of the population took part directly in the pros ecution of the war) the difference between zones of war and apparent zones of peace are not nearly as marked as in earlier periods. Just as it is difficult to distinguish between the political and the economic, public and private, military and civil, so it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and peace. The new war economy could be represented as a continuum, starting with the combination of criminality and racism to be found in the inner cities of Europe and North America and reaching its most acute manifestation in the areas where the scale of violence is greatest. If violence and predation are to be found in what are considered zones of peace, so it is possible to find islands of civility in nearly all the war zones. They are much less known about than the war zones, because it is violence and criminalitý and not normality that is generally reported. But there are regions where local state apparatuses continue to function, where taxes arc raised, services are provided and some production is maintained. There are groups who defend humanistic values and refuse the politics of particularism. The town of Tuzia in Bosnia— Herzegovina represents one celebrated example. The self-defence units created in Southern Rwanda arc another example. In isolation, these islands of civility are difficult to preserve, squeezed by the polarization of violence, but the very fragmentary and decentralized character of the new type of warfare makes such examples possible. Precisely because the new wars are a social condition that arises as the formal political economy withers, they are very difficult to end. Diplomatic negotiations from above fail to take into account the underlying social relations; they treat the various factions as though they were protostates. Temporary ceaselires or truces may merely legitimize new agreements or partnerships that, for the moment, suit the various factions. Peacekeeping troops sent in to monitor ceasefires which reflect the status quo may help to maintain a division of territory and to prevent the return of refugees. Economic reconstruction channelled through existing ‘political authorities’ may merely provide new sources of revenue as local assets dry up. As long as the power relations remain the same, sooner or later the violence will start again. Fear, hatred and predation are riot recipes for long-term viable polities. Indeed, this type of war economy is perennially on the edge of exhaustion. This does not mean, however, that they will disappear of their own accord. There has to be some alternative. In the next chapter, I will consider the possibilities for such an alternative; in particular, how islands of civility might offer a counterlogic to the new warfare.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC and their outdated conceptions of sovereignty and war to interrupt the cycle of acting so that we may update policy planning to fit a changing world

Kaldor 05, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror,” International Politics, 42.4, December 2005, pg 497-498

By analysing New War in terms of social relations of warfare, we come up with a very different approach about how to deal with these type of conflicts and indeed, how to deal with terrorism in general. I don't want to suggest that terrorism is not a serious threat. On the contrary, I think it is too serious to be hijacked by fantasies of Old War. Actually, I felt the same way about Communism; nuclear weapons, in my view, prevented us from adopting a serious strategy for undermining communism; this was only possible in a détente context. I think World War II really did mark the end of Old Wars. Wars of this type are impossible; they are simply too destructive to be fought and have become unacceptable and, indeed, illegitimate. The 8-year war between Iraq and Iran was probably the exception that proved the rule. It was immensely destructive and led to a military stalemate and, at least on the Iraqi side, far from consolidating the state, it was the beginning of state disintegration, the slide into new war.New Wars deliberately violate all the conventions of Old War, as well as the new body of human rights legislation that has been built up since World War II. The key to dealing with New Wars has to be the reconstruction of political legitimacy. If Old Wars established a notion of political legitimacy in terms of the friend-enemy distinction, in New Wars the friend-enemy distinction destroys political legitimacy. So, political legitimacy can only be reconstructed on the basis of popular consent and within a framework of international law. It means supporting efforts of democratization in difficult situations or using various international tools and law to support such processes.Is there a role for military force? Yes, I believe military force has to be used to protect people and uphold the rule of law. I favour humanitarian intervention in cases of threatened humanitarian catastrophes. But that can't be done through classic war fighting. I don't have time to discuss this, but I do think that one can envisage new defensive uses of forces aimed at prevention, protection and stabilization rather than victory.Carl Schmitt would argue that there can be no political community without enemies, and that, where force is used in the name of humanity, the adversary is no longer an enemy but an outlaw, a disturber of the peace. If he is right, the future is very grim, a pervasive global New War is possible. But if we believe political communities can be held together by reason rather than fear, then there is an alternative possibility, a transformation of statehood, in which states are no longer intrinsically linked to warfare and operate within a multilateral framework. And as for the argument about humanity, we could turn it on its head. If we dub the terrorists as enemies, we give them political status; indeed, this may be what they are trying to achieve. I think it is quite a good idea to see them as outlaws and disturbers of the peace, and to use the methods of policing and intelligence rather than Old War.To conclude, what I have tried to show is that attempts to recreate Old War prevent us from dealing with the realities of today's globalized world. Indeed ideas of Old War feed into and exacerbate real New Wars taking place in Iraq and elsewhere. I call them 'new' not because they are altogether new but because we can only develop alternative strategies if we see how different they are from World War II, the Cold War or the War on Terror. I think there is a huge security gap in the world today. Millions of people live in daily fear of violence. Yet, our conceptions of security, drawn from the dominant experience of World War II, does not reduce that insecurity. Indeed, it makes it worse.

### 1NC T

#### Interp and violation- “targeted killing” requires specific intel-based targets- this excludes signature strikes

**Anderson ’11** [Kenneth, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University; and Hoover Institution visiting fellow, member of Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law; nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution, “Distinguishing High Value Targeted Killing and “Signature” Attacks on Taliban Fighters,” August 29, <http://www.volokh.com/2011/08/29/distinguishing-high-value-targeted-killing-and-signature-attacks-on-taliban-fighters/>]

Another way to put this is that, loosely speaking, the high value targets are part of a counterterrorism campaign – a worldwide one, reaching these days to Yemen and other places. It is targeted killing in its strict sense using drones – aimed at a distinct individual who has been identified by intelligence. The “signature” strikes, by contrast, are not strictly speaking “targeted killing,” because they are aimed at larger numbers of fighters who are targeted on the basis of being combatants, but not on the basis of individuated intelligence. They are fighting formations, being targeted on a mass basis as part of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, as part of the basic CI doctrine of closing down cross-border safe havens and border interdiction of fighters. Both of these functions can be, and are, carried out by drones – though each strategic function could be carried out by other means, such as SEAL 6 or CIA human teams, in the case of targeted killing, or manned aircraft in the case of attacks on Taliban formations. The fundamental point is that they serve distinct strategic purposes. Targeted killing is not synonymous with drone warfare, just as counterterrorism is analytically distinct from counterinsurgency. (I discuss this in the opening sections of this draft chapter on SSRN.)

### 1NC CP

The Counsel to the President of the United States should request to the Office of Legal Counsel for legal counsel and coordination on the President’s war powers authority. The Office of Legal Counsel should advise the President that he should increase congressional review over the use of unstaffed aerial vehicles for targeted killings, including a ban on the use of signature strikes.

#### CP is competitive and solves the case ---- Coordination with OLC can ensure executive action

BORRELLI et al 2000 - Professor of Government Chair of the Government and International Relations Department, Connecticut College (Maryanne Borrelli, Karen Hult, Nancy Kassop, “The White House Counsel’s Office”, http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/files/counsel/Counsel-OD.PDF)

The White House Counsel’s Office is at the hub of all presidential activity. Its mandate is to be watchful for and attentive to legal issues that may arise in policy and political contexts in which the president plays a role. To fulfill this responsibility, it monitors and coordinates the presidency’s interactions with other players in and out of government. Often called “the president’s lawyer,” the Counsel’s Office serves, more accurately, as the “presidency’s lawyer,” with tasks that extend well beyond exclusively legal ones. These have developed over time, depending on the needs of different presidents, on the relationship between a president and a Counsel, and on contemporary political conditions. The Office carries out many routine tasks, such as vetting all presidential appointments and advising on the application of ethics regulations to White House staff and executive branch officials, but it also operates as a “command center” when crises or scandals erupt. Thus, the more sharply polarized political atmosphere in recent years has led to greater responsibility and demands, as well as heightened political pressure and visibility, on the traditionally low-profile Counsel’s Office. The high-stakes quality of its work has led to a common sentiment among Counsels and their staff that there is “zero tolerance” for error in this office.

In sum, the Counsel’s Office might be characterized as a monitor, a coordinator, a negotiator, a recommender, and a translator: it monitors ethics matters, it coordinates the president’s message and agenda with other executive branch units, it negotiates with a whole host of actors on the president’s behalf (not the least of which is Congress), it recommends myriad actions to the president, and it translates or interprets the law (whether it is the Constitution, federal rules and regulations, treaties or legislation) for all executive branch officials. Past Counsels have lamented that there is no job description for this office, while the opening quote from Peter Wallison makes clear that even if there was, it would be all-consuming and all-inclusive of everything that goes in and out of the president’s office.

In simple terms, the Counsel’s Office performs five basic categories of functions: (1) advising on the exercise of presidential powers and defending the president’s constitutional prerogatives; (2) overseeing presidential nominations and appointments to the executive and judicial branches; (3) advising on presidential actions relating to the legislative process; (4) educating White House staffers about ethics rules and records management and monitoring adherence; and (5) handling department, agency and White House staff contacts with the Department of Justice (see Functions section). In undertaking these responsibilities, the Counsel’s Office interacts regularly with, among others, the president, the Chief of Staff, the White House Office of Personnel, the Press Secretary, the White House Office of Legislative Affairs, the Attorney General, the Office of Management and Budget (on the legislative process), the General Counsels of the departments and agencies, and most especially, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice (see Relationships section). In addition to the Counsel, the Office usually consists of one or two Deputy Counsels, a varying number of Associate and Assistant Counsels, a Special Counsel when scandals arise, a Senior Counsel in some administrations, and support staff. Tasks are apportioned to these positions in various ways, depending on the Counsel’s choices, though most Counsels expect all Office members to share the ongoing vetting for presidential appointments (see Organization and Operations section).

Certain responsibilities within the Office are central at the very start of an administration (e.g., vetting for initial nominations and shepherding the appointment process through the Senate), while others have a cyclical nature to them (e.g., the annual budget, the State of the Union message), and still others follow an electoral cycle (e.g., determining whether presidential travel and other activities are partisan/electoral/campaign or governmental ones) (see Organization and Operations). There is, of course, the always unpredictable (but almost inevitable) flurry of scandals and crises, in which all eyes turn to the Counsel’s Office for guidance and answers. Watergate, Iran-contra, Whitewater, the Clinton impeachment, and the FBI files and White House Travel Office matters were all managed from the Counsel’s Office, in settings that usually separated scandal management from the routine work of the Office, so as to permit ongoing operations to continue with minimal distraction. Among the more regular tasks that occur throughout an administration are such jobs as directing the judicial nomination process, reviewing legislative proposals (the president’s, those from departments and agencies, and bills Congress has passed that need the Counsel’s recommendation for presidential signature or veto), editing and clearing presidential statements and speeches, writing executive orders, and determining the application of executive privilege (see both Relationships and Organization and Operations sections).

Perhaps, the most challenging task for the Counsel is being the one who has the duty to tell the president “no,” especially when it comes to defending the constitutional powers and prerogatives of the presidency. Lloyd Cutler, Counsel for both Presidents Carter and Clinton, noted that, in return for being “on the cutting edge of problems,” the Counsel needs to be someone who has his own established reputation…someone who is willing to stand up t o the President, to say, “No, Mr. President, you shouldn’t do that for these reasons.” There is a great tendency among all presidential staffs to be very sycophantic, very sycophantic. It’s almost impossible to avoid, “This man is the President of the United States and you want to stay in his good graces,” even when he is about to do something dumb; you don’t tell him that. You find some way to put it in a very diplomatic manner. (Cutler interview, pp. 3-4)

LAW, POLITICS AND POLICY

A helpful way to understand the Counsel’s Office is to see it as sitting at the intersection of law, politics and policy. Consequently, it confronts the difficult and delicate task of trying to reconcile all three of these without sacrificing too much of any one. It is the distinctive challenge of the Counsel’s Office to advise the president to take actions that are both legally sound and politically astute. A 1994 article in Legal Times warned of the pitfalls: Because a sound legal decision can be a political disaster, the presidential counsel constantly sacrifices legal ground for political advantage. (Bendavid, 1994, p. 13) For example, A.B. Culvahouse recalled his experience upon arriving at the White House as counsel and having to implement President Reagan’s earlier decision to turn over his personal diaries to investigators during the Iran-contra scandal.

Ronald Reagan’s decision to turn over his diary - that sits at the core of the presidency. …You’re setting up precedents and ceding a little power. But politically, President Reagan wanted to get it behind him. (Bendavid, 1994, p. 13)

Nonetheless, Culvahouse added, the Counsel is “the last and in some cases the only protector of the President’s constitutional privileges. Almost everyone else is willing to give those away in part inch by inch and bit by bit in order to win the issue of the day, to achieve compromise on today’s thorny issue. So a lot of what I did was stand in the way of that process...” (Culvahouse interview, p. 28)

Because of this blend of legal, political and policy elements, the most essential function a Counsel can perform for a president is to act as an “early warning system” for potential legal trouble spots before **(**and, ultimately, after) they erupt. For this role, a Counsel must keep his or her “antennae” constantly attuned. Being at the right meetings at the right time and knowing which people have information and/or the necessary technical knowledge and expertise in specific policy or legal areas are the keys to insuring the best service in this part of the position. C. Boyden Gray, Counsel for President Bush, commented: “As Culvahouse said -- I used to say that the meetings I was invited to, I shouldn’t go to. …It’s the meetings I wasn’t invited to that I’d go to.” (Gray interview, p. 26) Lloyd Cutler noted that

….the White House Counsel will learn by going to the staff meetings, et cetera, that something is about to be done that has buried within it a legal issue which the people who are advocating it either haven’t recognized or push under the rug. He says, “Wait a minute. We’ve got to check this out,” and goes to the Office of Legal Counsel and alerts them and gets their opinion. But for the existence of the White House Counsel, the Office of Legal Counsel would never have learned about the problem until it was too late. (Cutler interview, p. 4)

One other crucial part of the job where the legal overlaps with the policy and the political -- and which can spell disaster for Counsels who disregard this -- is knowing when to go to the Office of Legal Counsel for guidance on prevailing legal interpretations and opinions on the scope of presidential authority. It is then up to the White House Counsel to sift through these legal opinions, and to bring into play the operative policy and political considerations in order to offer the president his or her best recommendation on a course of presidential action. Lloyd Cutler described how this process works:

They [OLC staffers] are where the President has to go or the President’s counsel has to go to get an opinion on whether something may properly be done or not. For example, if you wish to invoke an executive privilege not to produce documents or something, the routine now is you go to the Office of Legal Counsel and you get their opinion that there is a valid basis for asserting executive privilege in this case. ...You’re able to say [to the judge who is going to examine these documents] the Office of Legal Counsel says we have a valid basis historically for asserting executive privilege here. (Cutler interview, p. 4)

C. Boyden Gray underscored the critical importance of OLC’s relationship to the Counsel’s Office: They [OLC] were the memory…We paid attention to what they did. [Vincent] Foster never conferred with them. When they [the Clinton Counsel’s Office] filed briefs on executive privilege, they had the criminal division, the civil division and some other division signing on the brief; OLC wasn’t on the brief… In some ways they [OLC] told us not to do things but that was helpful. They said no to us… I can give you a million examples. They would have said to Vince Foster, “Don’t go in and argue without thinking about it.” They would have prevented the whole healthcare debacle [referring to the Clinton Counsel’s Office’s position that Hillary Rodham Clinton was a government official for FACA purposes] …[T]he ripple effect of that one decision is hard to exaggerate: it’s hard to calculate. (Gray interview, pp. 18-19)

### 1NC DA

#### Immigration reform will pass now – tons of momentum and the GOP is getting on board but capital is key to a compromise

Hawkings 1/15/14 (David, Roll Call, Hawkings Here, "This Year's Legislative Acid Test: Immigration Rewrite")

And if the 2014 legislative effort comes up empty, it will reaffirm not only the president’s significantly shrunken legislative sway, but also the GOP’s interest in cultivating its most conservative fringes at the expense of all else.¶ Framed in those stark terms, it should be tough to predict that impasse is the likely outcome. That’s why advocates of a big bill, not only in the Hispanic community but also in the business world, are stoking every inkling of momentum.¶ All the attention remains, of course, on the House Republican leadership. It’s been there now for seven months, [since 68 senators voted for a measure](http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/immigration-overhaul-passes-senate/) combining a staggering border security beef-up with creation of a 13-year pathway to citizenship for the 11.5 million immigrants in the United States illegally.¶ The GOP leaders all want to put this issue behind them as quickly as practical — to get their party on the right side of demographic history before the nation’s fastest-growing ethnic group altogether abandons Republicans for a generation. (Mitt Romney took 27 percent of the Hispanic presidential vote last time, so there is still room for further decline.)¶ Word is that Speaker John A. Boehner, his three top leadership deputies and Judiciary Chairman Robert W. Goodlatte of Virginia will unveil a set of [vaguely worded policy goals](http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/boehner-says-gop-immigration-principles-to-be-released-soon/) for any bill during the next fortnight. The goal is two-fold: To signal, in advance of Obama’s State of the Union address, that their team is still interested in getting a bill, and to gauge how many in their own caucus are willing to at least keep an open mind on the matter.¶ The timing will then put the onus on the president to somehow respond in his speech. Obama and his aides are sending unmistakable signs that this year’s address will propose dead-on-arrival legislation designed to appeal to his party’s populist base during the campaign season while [he advances his agenda](http://www.rollcall.com/news/white_house_looks_past_congress_for_its_agenda-229990-1.html) almost entirely through regulations and public advocacy.¶ But “the pen, the phone and the podium,” to use the White House’s phrase, are not sufficient to change immigration policy. A jumpstart to that effort would come from Obama telling Congress on Jan. 28 how he is ready to compromise.¶ Ultimately, any deal would turn on the citizenship issue. Only if it gets resolved will there be any drive to solve disagreements about border security, the treatment of guest workers and increasing the number of visas for the highly skilled — or to decide if all immigration matters should be rolled into one bill or handled piecemeal.¶ Obama would need to back away from his desire to make a course toward citizenship as generous as the Senate’s, and then convince plenty of House Democrats to do the same in the name of partially solving a problem that would otherwise fester for years to come. House GOP leaders would need to persuade a few dozen of their own (a majority of the majority appearing out of the question) to abandon the position that any such pathway amounts to “amnesty” or “special treatment.”¶ And then at least 60 senators would need to acquiesce in whatever compromise was passed by the House.¶ The boundaries of this middle ground are getting clear to see. They are very close to what some House GOP leaders are talking about. And, according to a report this week from the National Foundation for American Policy, the result means about half the total number of current illegal residents would eventually get on a path to citizenship.¶ Goodlatte is now open to giving illegal immigrants provisional legal status, then permitting those with longstanding employment or with children or spouses who are citizens to seek a “green card” through existing channels. A green card means permanent legal residency and comes with its own timetable for becoming a citizen, usually within five years.¶ The nonpartisan research group’s study estimates 3.5 million to 5 million people could benefit from this approach, as would another 800,000 to 1.5 million if the law is changed to provide green cards to younger undocumented immigrants who arrived as children — the group now known as Dreamers.

#### Capital is key to a deal -

Albuquerque Journal 1/12/14 (Jim Kuhnhenn, The Associated Press, "Obama, Congress Face Crucial Immigration Push")

His agenda tattered by last year’s confrontations and missteps, President Barack Obama begins 2014 clinging to the hope of winning a lasting legislative achievement: an overhaul of immigration laws.¶ It will require a deft and careful use of his powers, combining a public campaign in the face of protests over his administration’s record number of deportations with quiet, behind-the-scenes outreach to Congress, something seen by lawmakers and immigration advocates as a major White House weakness.¶ In recent weeks, both Obama and House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, have sent signals that raised expectations among overhaul supporters that 2014 could still yield the first comprehensive change in immigration laws in nearly three decades. If successful, it would fulfill an Obama promise many Latinos say is overdue.

#### The GOP Will spin the plan as soft on terror – that’ll cause congressional backlash

Voorhees 5/23/13 (Josh, Editor of Slatest Magazine, Former Greenwire and Politico Reporter, "Slatest PM: GOP Senator Says Obama's Speech Will "Be Viewed by the Terrorists As a Victory")

No Love From the Right: [Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-outlines-new-rules-for-drones/2013/05/23/1b5918e6-c3cb-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html?hpid=z1): "Obama’s speech drew a quick response from Republicans, who have accused the president of downplaying the threat of terrorism. 'The president’s speech today will be viewed by terrorists as a victory,' said Sen. Saxby Chambliss (Ga.), the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. 'Rather than continuing successful counterterrorism activities, we are changing course with no clear operational benefit.' Chambliss was also critical of Obama’s plans to try to close Guantanamo, signaling the obstacles that the president will face in Congress."

#### High skilled workers key to biotech

**Mowad 7.** [Michelle, Doctor, “Cap on Visas for Skilled Foreign Workers Stifling Biotech, Tech”, San Diego Business Journal, 4-23, <http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/immigration-law-passports-visas-employment/10582800-1.html>]

The local biotechnology and technology industries, highly dependent on very highly skilled workers, are waiting to see if their foreign job applicants have been awarded work visas. U.S. immigration officials received twice the maximum number of applications for H-1B visas given to foreign individuals holding advanced degrees on the first day of the application process. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services opened the application process on April 2 for granting visas for the new fiscal year that starts Oct. 1. Because the "cap" was exceeded the first day, the USCIS will hold a lottery to select from the applicants who applied on the first and second days. There are enormous economic and health benefits to opening up employment to international candidates, said Kristie Ford with Biocom, a life sciences industry association representing 530-plus member companies in Southern California. "Biotech is an industry that is going to continue to boom, and we need a work force that fits the industry needs," she said. Domestic businesses use the H-1B program so they can hire foreign workers In occupations that require theoretical or technical expertise in specialized fields, such as accounting, architecture, education, engineering, law, mathematics, medicine and health, physics, social sciences and theology. Kevin Carroll, executive director of the San Diego chapter of the American Electronics Association, said technology businesses have a history of welcoming the best and brightest workers. He said there is a need to raise the cap. "We need more (H-1B visas) and we need them now," said Carroll, whose AeA chapter consists of 150 technology-based member businesses. He said that demand for technology employers is extremely high. The unemployment rate for engineers is significantly low at 2 percent, according to Carroll. "This has an impact on the ability of San Diego to stay competitive," he said. Carroll added that a limited number of work visas forces companies to go to extraordinary lengths for recruiting. Each year, the USCIS processes 65,000 H-1B visas. This year, the agency received 124,000 applications in the first two days. In addition, the USCIS will issue an additional 20,000 H-1B visas to foreigners who hold advanced degrees from U.S. universities. USCIS received 13,000 applications for this type of visa within the first two days of the processing period. Individuals who applied for the work visa earlier this month will now have to wait up to four weeks after April 12 before they know if they have been approved or need to leave the country. The wait and importance of H-1B visas to San Diego is at the forefront of many minds. Attorneys from the San Diego office of Duane Morris LLP will host a seminar on the current trends in employment, benefits and immigration law on April 26. Topics to be covered include H-1B visas and the caps being met so early. Lisa Spiegel, an immigration and nationality attorney with Duane Morris, said two years ago applications reached the cap amount in August. Last year, the applications reached the cap amount in May and this year on the first day. "It is a sign of the economy growing," she said. "Companies need more high-tech workers." She said highly skilled jobs in the computer and biotechnology industries are driving the need for a higher cap number. "Companies need employees with a certain level of education and skill set, and they can't find enough in the U.S. so they are willing to hire top talent from around the world, but the problem is that they can't get them into the U.S.," she said. She added that domestic companies often resort to opening foreign satellite offices because it is so difficult to bring professionals here. "The U.S. is losing out on attracting foreign workers and top talent to come here, we are losing their taxes, we are losing the company's tax base and we are losing the ability to make the U.S. a place where the top talent wants to come for graduate school," she said. And if foreigners can't be certain they can obtain a work visa after graduation from a U.S. university, they may be reluctant to attend school here, she said. "These are not people coming in illegally, these are people coming in and contributing to our country," she said. The economy of California will suffer as a result of this cap, said Spiegel. "Companies are losing workers and losing the ability to remain competitive because they cannot get enough people to staff their projects," she said. The San Diego office of Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo PC hosted an immigration strategies conference April 19 at Estancia La Jolla Hotel & Spa. William L. Coffman, an attorney with Mintz Levin's Boston office, was a speaker at the event. Coffman reviewed alternative visa options for foreigners who may not be awarded an H-1B visa. Biocom offers several programs aimed to attract a local and national work force. The association created a Life Sciences Success program to facilitate student internships, teacher externships and a summer life sciences boot camp to connect students and teachers with leading companies in San Diego's life sciences community. Last year, 34 students attended boot camp, 44 participated in summer internships and 18 educators carried out externships. "Bottom line is that life sciences companies need a skilled work force," said Ford, associate director of Workforce Development for Biocom. "Biocom is trying to help it two ways - we are trying to grow our homegrown work force, but then we also support raising the H-1B visa cap as well." While many companies are not optimistic applicants will receive these coveted H-1B visas, talk of immigration reform has permeated the market. For now, industry associates including Biocom and local businesses are attempting to garner support for reform to make life easier for biotechnology and technology.

#### Lack of adaptation tech causes extinction

**Trewavas 00** [Anthony, Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology – University of Edinburgh, “GM Is the Best Option We Have”, AgBioWorld, 6-5, <http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best_option.html>]

But these are foreign examples; global warming is the problem that requires the UK to develop GM technology. 1998 was the warmest year in the last one thousand years. Many think global warming will simply lead to a wetter climate and be benign. I do not. Excess rainfall in northern seas has been predicted to halt the Gulf Stream. In this situation, average UK temperatures would fall by 5 degrees centigrade and give us Moscow-like winters. There are already worrying signs of salinity changes in the deep oceans. Agriculture would be seriously damaged and necessitate the rapid development of new crop varieties to secure our food supply. We would not have much warning. Recent detailed analyses of arctic ice cores has shown that the climate can switch between stable states in fractions of a decade. Even if the climate is only wetter and warmer new crop pests and rampant disease will be the consequence. GM technology can enable new crops to be constructed in months and to be in the fields within a few years. This is the unique benefit GM offers. The UK populace needs to much more positive about GM or we may pay a very heavy price. In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would destroy much of our civilisation. **Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at survival**. Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that technological advance may be the only buffer between us and annihilation.

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## 1NC Case

### Adv 1

#### Signature strikes are key to counter-terrorism- multiple reasons

**Mudd 5-24**-13 [Philip Mudd was a senior official at the CIA and the FBI. He is now director of global risk at SouthernSun Asset Management, “Fear Factor,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear_factor_signature_strikes>]

The impact of armed drones during the decade-plus of this intense global counterterrorism campaign is hard to overestimate: Without operational commanders and visionary leaders, terror groups decay into locally focused threats, or disappear altogether. Targeted strikes against al Qaeda leaders and commanders in the years immediately after 9/11 deprived the group of the time and stability required to plot a major strike. But the London subway attacks in July 2005 illustrated the remaining potency of al Qaeda's core in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The threat was fading steadily. But not fast enough. So-called signature strikes -- in which target selection is based not on identification of an individual but instead on patterns of behavior or unique characteristics that identify a group -- accelerated this decline for simple reasons. Targeting leadership degrades a small percentage of a diffuse terror group, but developing the tactical intelligence required to locate an individual precisely enough to stage a pinpoint strike, in a no-man's land half a world away, is time-consuming and difficult. And it's not a perfect science; the leaders of groups learn over time how to operate more securely. Furthermore, these leaders represent only a fraction of the threat: Osama bin Laden might have been the public face of al Qaeda, but he was supported by a web of document-forgers, bombmakers, couriers, trainers, ideologues, and others. They made up the bulk of al Qaeda and propelled the apparatus that planned the murder of innocents. Bin Laden was the revolutionary leader, but it was the troops who executed his vision.¶ Signature strikes have pulled out these lower-level threads of al Qaeda's apparatus -- and that of its global affiliates -- rapidly enough that the deaths of top leaders are now more than matched by the destruction of the complex support structure below them. Western conceptions of how organizations work, with hierarchal structures driven by top-level managers, do not apply to al Qaeda and its affiliates. These groups are instead conglomerations of militants, operating independently, with rough lines of communication and fuzzy networks that cross continents and groups. They are hard to map cleanly, in other words. Signature strikes take out whole swaths of these network sub-tiers rapidly -- so rapidly that the groups cannot replicate lost players and their hard-won experience. The tempo of the strikes, in other words, adds sand to the gears of terror organizations, destroying their operational capability faster than the groups can recover.¶ There are other rationales for these attacks, though. Part of the reason signature strikes have become so prominent in this global counterterror war is, simply put, geography. Local terrorist groups only become international threats if they have leadership that can execute a broad, globalist vision, and if that leadership has the time and space to plot without daily distractions from armies and security services -- as in safe havens like Yemen, Somalia, the Sahel, and the tribal areas of Pakistan. These are exactly the places where the United States cannot apply conventional force and where local governments lack the capability or will to counter the threat. Exactly the places where drones offer an option to eviscerate a growing terror threat that has a dispersed, diffuse hierarchy. The places where signature strikes have proven effective.¶ With more capable security partners, the brutal destruction from drones above might come from more conventional operations on the ground. But, by definition, safe havens aren't penetrable by capable security services.

#### No AQAP impact- attacks fail

**Pape and Schneyer 8-16**-13 [Robert Pape is professor of political science at the University of Chicago, and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism. David Schneyer is a Research Associate at the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, “Why we shouldn’t be afraid of Al Qaeda in Yemen,” <http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/08/15/how-stop-crying-wolf-while-remaining-safe/PVwCQr3be7eQHdrQPCvlJO/story.html>]

Last week, the US State Department closed and evacuated 19 of its embassies, and issued a worldwide travel alert based on intelligence concerning a terrorist organization based in Yemen. Many Americans are asking what this means. Is an attack on US soil imminent?¶ While nothing is certain, of course, it is unlikely that such an attack would take place in the United States, or even outside of Yemen.¶ The intelligence seems to be reliable. But individual data points can be exaggerated or ignored, depending on the domestic political environment of the time. In this case, the State Department acted due to “increased chatter” that it monitored among terrorist groups. Intelligence officials highlighted one communication in particular, in which Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri gave his blessing to an attack proposed by Nasser al-Wuhayshi. Wuhayshi is the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—a sort of “franchise affiliate” based in Yemen, not to be confused with the central Al Qaeda organization.¶ Such information certainly warrants our attention. But talk is cheap, and it is critical that we don’t give terrorist organizations more credit than they are worth. In order to understand what a terrorist organization is truly capable of, we must look at its past behavior. In this case, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is a deadly organization within its own borders, but it has not demonstrated that it possesses the means to successfully carry out an attack on US soil. The one known attempt (carried out by the so-called “underwear bomber”) failed due to incompetence — the device did not properly detonate.¶ Let’s look at the data: AQAP has carried out 39 suicide attacks through 2012, with only one taking place outside of Yemen (just across the border in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia). Suicide attacks represent precisely the sort of attack we would fear—they are far more deadly than any other type. Now, AQAP has certainly proven itself capable of killing foreigners within its own borders, and so we should absolutely take the intercepted communication seriously with respect to our embassy in Yemen. But this is a far cry from being able to carry out an attack on foreign soil.¶ Consider 9/11, for instance, which obviously we failed to prevent. This failure was not a tactical one, or even a failure to “connect the dots.” Rather, it was a failure to properly assess the threat. In fact, a memo stating “Bin Laden determined to attack US” made it to the White House by early August, 2001— the intelligence was there, but it was simply not given its due credibility or seriousness. The table to the right illustrates this point.¶ Clearly, Al Qaeda proved itself capable of attacking the United States across multiple borders long before 2001. But AQAP has not demonstrated this capability, and “increased chatter” among its leaders, no matter how heavy, is simply not enough evidence to be overly-concerned, unless the government has not revealed other critical details. Even if Zawahiri were directing the attack—which US intelligence officials confirmed he was not—the main Al Qaeda group (now based in Pakistan) has not carried out a successful major attack on Western soil since the London bombings in 2005. Ayman Al-Zawahiri giving his blessing to AQAP leaders only proves how weak the main Al Qaeda group really is.¶ What does this mean from a policy perspective? Has the Obama administration acted correctly? Even if not, perhaps we should be thankful that it “over-assessed” the threat. Better safe than sorry, right?¶ Not exactly. While we should applaud our government for doing everything it can to keep us safe, we can still expect better. It is not a question of whether we over-prepare, but whether we use our intelligence as wisely and efficiently as possible. This means systematically using tactical intelligence by examining it through the lens of past strategic behavior.¶ Of course there will be some terrorist organizations that are so new that we won’t have much past strategic behavior to study. In those circumstances, we must rely on judgment of short-term tactical intelligence. But most cases are in the “muddy middle” — where there is a group that has existed for at least several years, we need to qualify the tactical intelligence based on the demonstrated attack pattern of the group. We shouldn’t assume every group is capable of a major attack on US soil.¶ Critics might point to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempted bombing of a passenger plane over Detroit in 2009 as an example of AQAP’s ability to attack US soil. The attack wasn’t successful, but not on account of American security — the device simply didn’t detonate.¶ Terrorism is not baseball, where a .333 batting average is considered successful, and where there are opportunities for multiple “at-bats.” Globally ambitious terrorist organizations thrive on the element of surprise. A single failed attempt — as in 2009 — prompts a violent response from the target nation to neutralize any future threats. That is exactly what the United States did in that case —by introducing full-body scans to airport security to detect precisely the type of device Abdulmutallab used, and by assassinating AQAP leader Anwar Al-Awlaki via drone strikes.¶ If the attempted 2009 bombing was so easy, AQAP would have sent another bomber in Abdulmutallab’s wake, or maybe three or four with him on the same day. The very fact that the device did not detonate does not breed confidence in AQAP’s ability to carry out a successful attack.¶ It is time for a thorough reassessment of our terrorist alert policies. We should absolutely appreciate our government’s ability to recognize terrorist threats. But a more specific alert policy based on an organization’s past behavior would save time and effort, while preserving peace of mind.

#### No Yemen blowback- on-site studies prove economics outweigh

**Swift ‘12** [Christopher, PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge, term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the American Society of International Law, Adjunct Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown University and a Fellow at the University of Virginia Law School’s Center for National Security Law, served in the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, where he investigated international transactions involving terrorist syndicates, weapons proliferators, and other sanctioned entities, served as an International Law Fellow at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, “The Drone Blowback Fallacy,” July 1, <http://christopher-swift.com/publications/the-drone-blowback-fallacy>]

Critics argue that drone strikes create new adversaries and drive al Qaeda’s recruiting. As the Yemeni youth activist Ibrahim Mothana recently wrote in The New York Times, “Drone strikes are causing more and more Yemenis to hate America and join radical militants; they are not driven by ideology but rather by a sense of revenge and despair.” The Washington Post concurs. In May, it reported that the “escalating campaign of U.S. drone strikes [in Yemen] is stirring increasing sympathy for al Qaeda-linked militants and driving tribesmen to join a network linked to terrorist plots against the United States.” The ranks of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have tripled to 1,000 in the last three years, and the link between its burgeoning membership, U.S. drone strikes, and local resentment seems obvious.¶ Last month, I traveled to Yemen to study how AQAP operates and whether the conventional understanding of the relationship between drones and recruitment is correct. While there, I conducted 40 interviews with tribal leaders, Islamist politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources. These subjects came from 14 of Yemen’s 21 provinces, most from rural regions. Many faced insurgent infiltration in their own districts. Some of them were actively fighting AQAP. Two had recently visited terrorist strongholds in Jaar and Zinjibar as guests. I conducted each of these in-depth interviews using structured questions and a skilled interpreter. I have withheld my subjects’ names to protect their safety — a necessity occasioned by the fact that some of them had survived assassination attempts and that others had recently received death threats.¶ These men had little in common with the Yemeni youth activists who capture headlines and inspire international acclaim. As a group, they were older, more conservative, and more skeptical of U.S. motives. They were less urban, less wealthy, and substantially less secular. But to my astonishment, none of the individuals I interviewed drew a causal relationship between U.S. drone strikes and al Qaeda recruiting. Indeed, of the 40 men in this cohort, only five believed that U.S. drone strikes were helping al Qaeda more than they were hurting it.¶ Al Qaeda exploits U.S. errors, to be sure. As the Yemen scholar Gregory Johnsen correctly observes, the death of some 40 civilians in the December 2009 cruise missile strike on Majala infuriated ordinary Yemenis and gave AQAP an unexpected propaganda coup. But the fury produced by such tragedies is not systemic, not sustained, and, ultimately, not sufficient. As much as al Qaeda might play up civilian casualties and U.S. intervention in its recruiting videos, the Yemeni tribal leaders I spoke to reported that the factors driving young men into the insurgency are overwhelmingly economic.¶ From al Hudaydah in the west to Hadhramaut in the east, AQAP is building complex webs of dependency within Yemen’s rural population. It gives idle teenagers cars, khat, and rifles — the symbols of Yemeni manhood. It pays salaries (up to $400 per month) that lift families out of poverty. It supports weak and marginalized sheikhs by digging wells, distributing patronage to tribesmen, and punishing local criminals. As the leader of one Yemeni tribal confederation told me, “Al Qaeda attracts those who can’t afford to turn away.”¶ Religious figures echoed these words. Though critical of the U.S. drone campaign, none of the Islamists and Salafists I interviewed believed that drone strikes explain al Qaeda’s burgeoning numbers. “The driving issue is development,” an Islamist parliamentarian from Hadramout province said. “Some districts are so poor that joining al Qaeda represents the best of several bad options.” (Other options include criminality, migration, and even starvation.) A Salafi scholar engaged in hostage negotiations with AQAP agreed. “Those who fight do so because of the injustice in this country,” he explained. “A few in the north are driven by ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and corruption.”¶ Despite Yemenis’ antipathy toward drones, my conversations also revealed a surprising degree of pragmatism. Those living in active conflict zones drew clear distinctions between earlier U.S. operations, such as the Majala bombing, and more recent strikes on senior al Qaeda figures. “Things were very bad in 2009,” a tribal militia commander from Abyan province told me, “but now the drones are seen as helping us.” He explained that Yemenis could “accept [drones] as long as there are no more civilian casualties.” An Islamist member of the separatist al-Harak movement offered a similar assessment. “Ordinary people have become very practical about drones,” he said. “If the United States focuses on the leaders and civilians aren’t killed, then drone strikes will hurt al Qaeda more than they help them.”¶ Some of the men I interviewed admitted that they had changed their minds about drone strikes. Separatists in Aden who openly derided AQAP as a proxy of Yemen’s recently deposed president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, privately acknowledged the utility of the U.S. drone campaign. “Saleh created this crisis in order to steal from America and stay in power,” a former official from the now-defunct People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen told me. “Now it is our crisis, and we need every tool to solve it.”¶ Yemeni journalists, particularly those with firsthand exposure to AQAP, shared this view: “I opposed the drone campaign until I saw what al Qaeda was doing in Jaar and Zinjibar,” an independent reporter in Aden said. “Al Qaeda hates the drones, they’re absolutely terrified of the drones … and that is why we need them.”

#### Yemen is not key to terrorism- terrorists can adapt elsewhere

**Katulis ’10** [Brian, master’s from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs and Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Terrorism in Yemen Rediscovered,” Jan. 6, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/yemen_rediscovered.html>]

America’s attention deficit disorder-afflicted media spent the last week rediscovering Yemen as a country of serious concern for global security. The renewed attention on Yemen, resulting from the failed Christmas Day airline bombing attempt in Detroit, reminds us that terror networks adapt and can quickly defy conventional military responses like troop surges in Afghanistan and Iraq by migrating around the world. Top newspapers have sent correspondents into Yemen, and last night, ABC’s “World News Tonight” program led with a story quoting an expert saying that Yemen is a “near perfect haven” for terrorists. The fact that leading news organizations still perpetuate the “safe haven” myth, even as a number of terrorism experts and analysts have noted the flaws and fallacies of “safe haven” arguments, is astounding. The most important preparations for the 9/11 attacks took place in Germany and flight schools in the United States. Stateless terror networks can be just as lethal when they use our own territory or countries as a base—even with strong law enforcement and intelligence organizations operating in those areas. The sooner our country understands that, the quicker we’ll adapt our thinking to make our country safer.

**Newest empirical study proves no risk—multiple market solutions**

**Khadduri ’11** - Former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief (Walid, "The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations", <http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html>)

What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to be large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that the IMF has not endorsed its findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, "Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are They Really That Bad?", IMF Working Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using a comprehensive global dataset […] we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small: a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about **half of one percent or less.”** The study elaborates on this by stating that this impact differs from one country to another, depending on the size of oil-imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts [represented in new and additional expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries]”. In other words, the more oil prices increase, benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are recycled, for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports. The researchers argue that the series of oil price rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United States. However, Rasmussen and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S. economy in the previous period (the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy) has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy.

**Their part of the Royal evidence is just a review of other peoples arguments- the conclusion votes neg**

**Royal ‘10** (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer)

**CONCLUSION**

The logic of ECST supports arguments for greater economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conﬂict. This chapter does not argue against the utility of signalling theory. It does, however, suggest that **when considering** the occurrence of and conditions created by **economic crises**, **ECST logic is dubious** as an organising principle for security policymakers. The discussion pulls together some distinct areas of research that have not yet featured prominently in the ECST literature. **Studies** associating economic interdependence, economic crises and the potential for external conﬂict **indicate** that **global interdependence is not necessarily a conﬂict suppressing process and may be conﬂict-enhancing** at certain points. Furthermore, the conditions created by economic crises decrease the willingness of states to send economic costly signals, even though such signals may be most effective during an economic crisis. These two points warrant further consideration in the debate over ECST and, more broadly, theories linking interdependence and peace. The debate takes on particular importance for policymakers when considering the increasingly important US-China relationship and the long-term prospects for peace in the Asia-Paciﬁc. Recent US policy towards China, such as the ‘responsible stakeholder’ approach, assumes that greater interdependence with China should decrease the likelihood for conﬂict. Some have even suggested that the economic relationship is necessary to ensure strategic competition does not lead to major war (see, e.g., Kastner, 2006). If US or Chinese policymakers do indeed intend to rely on economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conﬂict, much more study is required to understand how and when interdependence impacts the security and the defence behaviour of states. This chapter contributes some thoughts to that larger debate. NOTES I. Notable counterarguments include Barbieri (1996). Gowa (I994), and Levy and Ali I998 . 2.‘ Ofﬁ<):ial statements have focused on this explanation as well. See, for example, Bernanke (2009). 3. For a dissenting study. see Elbadawi and Hegre (2008). 4. Note that Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) argue that states will have a greater incentive to arm against those with which it is interdependent to hedge against coercion. This argument could be extended to include protectionism in extreme cases. Creseenzi (2005) both challenges and agrees with Copeland’s theory by suggesting that a more important indicator is the exit costs involved in terminating an economic relationship. which could be a function of the availability of alternatives. 5. There is also **substantial research** to indicate that periods of strong economic growth are also **positively correlated with** a **rise in** the **likelihood of conﬂict**. Pollins (2008) and Pollins and Schweller (I999) provide excellent insights into this body of literature.

**No diversionary theory or increased probability of war**

**Jervis ’11** (Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that **even if** the more extreme versions of **free trade and** economic **liberalism become discredited**, **it is hard to see how** without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict **leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by** **impoverishing or** even **attacking others**. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that **the** very fact that **we have seen** **such a sharp economic down-turn** **without anyone suggesting** that **force** of arms is the solution shows that **even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict**, **it will not make war thinkable**.

**India terror attacks won’t cause Indo-Pak war**

**Chaudhary ’11** (India faces chronic low-grade terror threat, but Pakistan relationship is safe Posted By Ian Bremmer Wednesday, September 14, 2011 - 4:45 PM Share By Shamila N. Chaudhary Shamila N. Chaudhary is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Asia practice.

The Sept. 7 bombing of the Delhi High Court that killed 13 underscores the ever-present security threat from militants in India's major cities. But while relatively small attacks are likely to be a fact of life for the foreseeable future, **they do not fundamentally change the security picture.** The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is, however, likely to ramp up its criticism of the Congress government. More importantly, the attacks **will not cause a strategic shift in the Indian government's relationship** with Pakistan, despite the claims of responsibility from radical Islamist groups with connections to Pakistan. It's still unclear who is responsible for the attack. A member of the Pakistan and Bangladesh based Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) terror group purportedly sent an email claiming responsibility for the blast. But another email on Sept. 8 claimed responsibility for the Indian Mujahideen (IM), the main suspect in the July 13 bombings in Mumbai. HuJI's email claimed the purpose of the attack was to coerce the Indian government into commuting the death sentence of Afzal Guru, convicted of conspiracy in the 2001 attack on India's parliament building. Both groups have executed a number of similar attacks in India over the last several years. The Indian government has not identified the group responsible for the blast, but three Kashmiri men have been arrested. Regardless of which group is culpable, the attack may boost limited domestic pressure on the Congress government, but will have little effect on India's relationship with Pakistan. Immediately after the attack, Prime Minister Manmohan **Singh called for cooperation, not accusations**, in the face of the **growing terror threat** in India. This message may have been intended more for domestic audiences than targeted at Pakistan, given the political pressures the Congress party currently faces in light of a series of corruption scandals and the July Mumbai bombings. While national elections will not be held until 2014, the BJP is likely to once again make the government's poor handling of terrorism a campaign issue despite calls for additional intelligence gathering. The fragile nature of the ongoing dialogue with Pakistan also factors into Singh's calculus. Singh perceives the dialogue as one of his legacy issues, but enjoys little political support in the Indian government outside a handful of senior officials and aides. But any derailment of the dialogue with Pakistan limits India's ability to influence Islamabad for more progress on the trials related to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. India is also likely to mute its response because of its desire to sustain its development and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan without threat from Pakistan-based groups. Pakistan will also manage its message closely, as its damaged relationship with the United States is still on the mend. Neither does the resurgence of hostile rhetoric with India serve the interests of the civilian and military leadership, which are both desperate to improve their domestic image after the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

### Adv 2

#### Systemic opposition dooms soft power- drones aren’t key

**Wike ’12** [Richard Wike is associate director of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Wait, You Still Don't Like Us?” September 19, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/19/you_still_don_t_like_us?page=full>]

Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world, an issue that was front and center throughout much of the George W. Bush era, is squarely back in the news following the protests that swept across more than 20 countries in reaction to a controversial anti-Islam film. The all-too-familiar images of angry demonstrators burning the Stars and Stripes are a dramatic reminder that, while the image of the United States has improved throughout many parts of the world during Barack Obama's presidency, negative views of America remain stubbornly persistent in key Muslim countries. Much of this animosity is due to continuing concerns about U.S. power and widespread opposition to major elements of American foreign policy. But it's not just about the United States -- rather, anti-Americanism needs to be seen within a broader context of distrust between Muslims and the West.¶ Following his election, Obama made it a priority to change America's dismal image in the Muslim world, most prominently in his June 2009 Cairo speech. And he has had some successes; in fact, Muslim publics still generally give him more positive ratings than Bush received. For instance, in a spring 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, only 24 percent of Turks express confidence in Obama; still, that's a whole lot better than the 2 percent who felt this way about Bush during his final year in office. Also, due in part to having lived there for a few years as a child, Obama has consistently received high marks in Indonesia, and his popularity has helped turn around America's image in the world's most populous Muslim nation.¶ But overall, the picture remains grim. In Egypt, for example, despite all the tumult of the revolution, America's image remains roughly where it was four years ago -- then 22 percent expressed a favorable opinion of the United States; in the 2012 poll, it was 19 percent. Among Pakistanis and Jordanians, America's already poor ratings have declined further since 2008 -- in both countries, 19 percent held a positive view of the U.S. four years ago, compared with just 12 percent in 2012.¶ Why hasn't America's image improved? In part, many Muslims around the world continue to voice the same criticisms of U.S. foreign policy that were common in the Bush years. U.S. anti-terrorism efforts are still widely unpopular. America is still seen as ignoring the interests of other countries. Few think Obama has been even-handed in dealing with the Israelis and the Palestinians. And the current administration's increased reliance on drone strikes to target extremists is overwhelmingly unpopular -- more than 80 percent of Jordanians, Egyptians, and Turks oppose the drone campaign.¶ The opposition to drone strikes points to a broader issue: a widespread distrust of American power. This is especially true when the United States employs hard power, whether it's the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq or the drone attacks in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. But it is true even for elements of American soft power. Predominantly Muslim nations are generally among the least likely to embrace U.S. popular culture or the spread of American ideas and customs. Only 36 percent of Egyptians like American music, movies, and television, and just 11 percent believe it is good that U.S. ideas and customs are spreading to their country.¶ But America's image problems are not due solely to fears of American power. In some ways, the issue of anti-Americanism is part of a broader story about mutual distrust between Muslims and Westerners. Polling by Pew in 2006 and 2011 highlighted the extent to which Muslim and Western publics see their relations with each other as bad, and the degree to which they blame each other for the poor state of affairs.¶ In the West, fears about extremism and violence continue to play a role in driving these views. Among Muslims, many describe Westerners as selfish, greedy, and violent, and the 2011 poll found majorities of Muslims in Egypt, the Palestinian territories, Pakistan, and Turkey saying that both Americans and Europeans tend to be hostile toward Muslims. Also, large numbers of Muslims surveyed in 2011 blamed Western policies for the lack of prosperity in Muslim nations.¶ Just like the headlines from the past week, the survey data paint a fairly bleak picture. The "Obama effect" that changed America's battered image in Europe and other parts of the globe did not register in many predominantly Muslim nations. Even so, there are some hopeful signs. For one thing, it is important to keep in mind that the "Muslim world" is not monolithic. In the 2012 Pew survey, two-thirds of Lebanese Sunni Muslims expressed a positive view of the United States. In newly democratic Tunisia, opinions were equally divided, with 45 percent giving the United States a positive rating and 45 percent a negative one. Previous polling found largely positive views of the United States among Muslims in Indonesia and Nigeria following Obama's election.

#### Obama mishandles credibility- no impact

**Lagon ’11** [Mark P. Lagon is the International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-Large to Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US Department of State, “The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama,” September/October, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama>]

Tne irony of the Obama presidency is how much it relies on hard power. The president came into office proposing a dramatic shift from George W. Bush’s perceived unilateralism, and most of his predecessor’s hard-edged counterterrorism tactics and massive deployments in wars abroad. Yet after three years, Obama has escalated forces in Afghanistan, embraced the widespread use of unmanned drones to kill terrorists at the risk of civilian casualties, kept Guantánamo open, and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in a thoroughly unilateral fashion.¶ What he hasn’t accomplished to any great degree is what most observers assumed would be the hallmark of his approach to foreign affairs—a full assertion of the soft power that makes hard power more effective. His 2008 campaign centered on a critique of President Bush’s overreliance on hard power. Obama suggested he would rehabilitate the damaged image of America created by these excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy nation. Upon taking office, he made fresh-start statements, such as his June 2009 remarks in Cairo, and embraced political means like dialogue, respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to change minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from the recent US approach to the world—and that he would quickly remedy that defect.¶ Yet President Obama’s conception of soft power has curiously lacked the very quality that has made it most efficacious in the past—the values dimension . This may seem odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto “the audacity of hope” and his deployment of soaring rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored the values dimension of soft power, which goes beyond the tradecraft of diplomacy and multilateral consultation to aggressively assert the ideals of freedom in practical initiatives. The excision of this values dimension renders soft power a hollow concept.¶ The Obama presidency has regularly avoided asserting meaningful soft power, particularly in its relations with three countries—Iran, Russia, and Egypt—where it might have made a difference not only for those countries but for American interests as well. His reaction to the challenges these countries have posed to the US suggest that it is not soft power itself that Obama doubts, but America’s moral standing to project it.

**Multilateral adaptation cant’ solve warming**

 **Singer et al 11**, Dr. S. Fred Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, Professor Emeritus of Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a Member of the International Academy of Astronautics; Robert M. Carter, Research Professor at James Cook University (Queensland) and the University of Adelaide (South Australia), palaeontologist, stratigrapher, marine geologist and environmental scientist with more than thirty years professional experience; and Craig D. Idso, founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, and Association of American Geographers, et al, 2011, “Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report,” online: <http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/FrontMatter.pdf>

Decades-long empirical trends of climate-sensitive measures of human well-being, including the percent of developing world population suffering from chronic hunger, poverty rates, and deaths due to extreme weather events, reveal dramatic improvement during the twentieth century, notwithstanding the historic increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. The magnitude of the impacts of climate change on human well-being depends on society's adaptability (adaptive capacity), which is determined by, among other things, the wealth and human resources society can access in order to obtain, install, operate, and maintain technologies necessary to cope with or take advantage of climate change impacts. The IPCC **systematically underestimates adaptive capacity** by failing to take into account the **greater wealth and technological advances** that will be present at the time for which impacts are to be estimated. Even accepting the IPCC's and Stern Review's worst-case scenarios, and assuming a compounded annual growth rate of per-capita GDP of only 0.7 percent, reveals that net GDP per capita in developing countries in 2100 would be **double the 2006 level of the U.S.** and triple that level in 2200. Thus, even **developing countries' future ability** to cope with climate change would be **much better than that of the U.S. today**. The IPCC's embrace of biofuels as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was premature, as many researchers have found "even the best biofuels have the potential to damage the poor, the climate, and biodiversity" (Delucchi, 2010). Biofuel production consumes nearly as much energy as it generates, competes with food crops and wildlife for land, and is unlikely to ever meet more than a small fraction of the world's demand for fuels. The notion that global **warming might cause war** and social unrest is not only wrong, but even **backwards** - that is, **global cooling has led to wars** and social unrest in the past, whereas global warming has coincided with periods of **peace, prosperity, and** social **stability**.

## 2NC

### A2 Case Outweighs

#### Second, prefer our impacts – They have card 0 that proves that their impacts are epistemologically justified ----- their internal link chains and impact claims have too many fundamental flaws related to ideological biases (and, they can’t defend empiricism/positivism because they can’t meet the standards to falsifiability)

Kaldor 99, (Mary, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, 2006 “New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era”, p69-70)

The political goals of the new wars are about the claim to power on the basis of seemingly traditional identities — nation, tribe, religion. Yet the upsurge in the politics of particularisticidentities cannot be understood in traditional terms. It has to be explained in the context of a growing cultural dissonance between those who participate in transnational networks which communicate through e-mail, faxes, telephone and air travel, and those who are excluded from global processes and are tied to localities even though their lives may be profoundly shapedby those same processes.It would be a mistake to assume that this cultural divide can be expressed in simple political terms, that those who supportparticularistic identity politics are reacting against the processesof globalization, while those who favour a more tolerant,multicultural universalistic approach are part of the new globalclass. On the contrary, among the globalists are to be founddiaspora nationalists and fundamentalists, ‘realists’ and neo-liberals who believe that compromises with nationalism offersthe best hope for stability0 as well as transnational criminal groupswho profit from the new wars. And while there are many amongthe territorially tied who are likely to cling to traditional identities, there are also courageous individuals and citizens’ groupswho refuse particularisms and exclusiveness.The point is rather that the processes known as globalization are breaking up the cultural and socio-economic divisions that defined the patterns of politics which characterized the modernperiod. The new type of warfare has to be understood in termsof this global dislocation. New forms of power struggle may takethe guise of traditional nationalism, tribalism or communalism, but they are, nevertheless, contemporary phenomena arising. From contemporary causes and displaying new characteristics. Moreover, they are paralleled by a growing global consciousness and sense of global responsibility among an array of governmentaland non-governmental institutions as well as individuals.In this chapter, O describe some of the key characteristics ofthe process known as globalization and how they give rise tonew forms of identity politics. In the last section, ¡ shall try tooutline the emerging political cleavage between the politics ofparticularistic identity and the politics of cosmopolitan or humanist values.

#### Third failure to account for the broad socio-economico-political reasons for warfare destroys autonomy and value to life

Srnicek, 10 – degree in political science from the University of Western Ontario, graduate student in International Relations at the London School of Economics, Mendeley member in Social Sciences, (Nick, “Conflict Networks: Collapsing the Global into the Local”, Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 2, 2010, [http://criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/30\_64\_CONFLICT\_NETWORKS\_ JCGS2.pdf](http://criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/30_64_CONFLICT_NETWORKS_%20JCGS2.pdf)

Beyond the tracing of lines, this ontology also leads one to proliferate the actors involved. Rather than reducing the world to a lifeless husk through which a few major forces play out their battles (e.g. the forces of modernization, class conflict, ethnic war, clash of civilizations, etc.), it must be acknowledge that social forces act through actors that have their own relative autonomy. Thus, accounts of conflict which attempt to explain it on the basis of greed, grievances, a ‘new barbarism’, underdevelopment, ethnicity or nationalism are weak accounts, accordingly.20 They do not trace the pathways through which these causal factors are actually carried out and their efficacy created. It makes no difference to these theories, whether the resources in question are oil or whether they are cocaine or agriculture. It makes no difference to them whether the weapons used are machetes, assault rifles, explosives, or armored vehicles. An ANT (actor-network theory) analysis rejects this structuralism, and looks at how each actor contributes and constructs phenomena. For instance, grievances may form a part of a conflict system, but they must pass through – and be altered by – familial relations, education by religious leaders, the pervasiveness of nationalism within local textbooks, the networks of informal relations between disparate hierarchies, etc. An account which attempts to reduce a conflict to grievance or greed ultimately explains nothing.

### Alt

#### Our argument isn’t that planning is bad, it is that their planning is bad. All war powers are based off of neo-conservative metaphors to the “war on terror”. Only the alternative allows for true restriction.

Lakoff and Frisch 06, George Lakoff, senior research associate at the Rockridge Institute and Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distringuised Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the Univeristy of California, Berkeley, and Evan Frish, senior research associates at The Rockridge Institute and the Rockridge Institutes Technology Strategist, “Five Years After 9/11: Drop the War Metaphor,” September 11, 2006, <http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0911-20.htm>

Language matters, because it can determine how we think and act. For a few hours after the towers fell on 9/11, administration spokesmen referred to the event as a "crime." Indeed, Colin Powell argued within the administration that it be treated as a crime. This would have involved international crime-fighting techniques: checking banks accounts, wire-tapping, recruiting spies and informants, engaging in diplomacy, cooperating with intelligence agencies in other governments, and if necessary, engaging in limited "police actions" with military force. Indeed, such methods have been the most successful so far in dealing with terrorism. But the crime frame did not prevail in the Bush administration. Instead, a war metaphor was chosen: the "War on Terror." Literal not metaphorical wars are conducted against armies of other nations. They end when the armies are defeated militarily and a peace treaty is signed. Terror is an emotional state. It is in us. It is not an army. And you can't defeat it militarily and you can't sign a peace treaty with it. The war metaphor was chosen for political reasons. First and foremost, it was chosen for the domestic political reasons. The war metaphor defined war as the only way to defend the nation. From within the war metaphor, being against war as a response was to be unpatriotic, to be against defending the nation. The war metaphor put progressives on the defensive. Once the war metaphor took hold, any refusal to grant the president full authority to conduct the war would open progressives in Congress to the charge of being unpatriotic, unwilling to defend America, defeatist. And once the military went into battle, the war metaphor created a new reality that reinforced the metaphor. Once adopted, the war metaphor allowed the president to assume war powers, which made him politically immune from serious criticism and gave him extraordinary domestic power to carry the agenda of the radical right: Power to shift money and resources away from social needs and to the military and related industries. Power to override environmental safeguards on the grounds of military need. Power to set up a domestic surveillance system to spy on our citizens and to intimidate political enemies. Power over political discussion, since war trumps all other topics. In short, power to reshape America to the vision of the radical right with no end date. In addition, the war metaphor was used as justification for the invasion of Iraq, which Bush had planned for since his first week in office. Frank Luntz, the right-wing language expert, recommended referring to the Iraq war as part of the "War on Terror" even when it was known that Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with 9/11 and indeed saw Osama bin Laden as an enemy. Fox News used "War on Terror" as a headline when showing film clips from Iraq. Remember "Weapons of Mass Destruction?" They were invented by the Bush administration to strike terror into the hearts of Americans and to justify the invasion. Remember that the Iraq War was advocated before 9/11 and promoted as early as 1997 by the members of the Project for the New American Century, who later came to dominate in the Bush administration. Why? The right-wing strategy was to use the American military to achieve economic and strategic goals in the Middle East: to gain control of the second largest oil reserve in the world; to place military bases right in the heart of the Middle East for the sake of economic and political intimidation; to open up Middle East markets and economic opportunities for American corporations; and to place American culture and a controllable government in the heart of the Middle East. The justification was 9/11 to identify the Iraq invasion as part of the "War on Terror" and claim that it is necessary in order to protect America and spread democracy. What has been the result? Domestically, the "War on Terror" has been a major success for the radical right. Bush has been returned to office and the radical right controls all branches of our government. They are realizing their goals. Social programs are being gutted. Deregulation and privatization are thriving. Even highways are being privatized. Taxpayers' money is being transferred to the ultra-rich making them richer. Two right-wing justices have been appointed to the Supreme Court and right-wing judges are taking over courts all over America. The environment continues to be plundered. Domestic surveillance is in place. Corporate profits have doubled while wage levels have declined. Oil profits are astronomical. And the radical rights social agenda is taking hold. The "culture war" is being won on many fronts. And it is still widely accepted that we are fighting a "War on Terror." The metaphor is still in place. We are still taking off our shoes at the airports, and now we cannot take bottled water on the planes. Terror is being propped up. But while the radical right has done well on the domestic front, America and Americans have fared less well both at home and abroad. What was the moral of 9/11? To Osama bin Laden, the moral was simple: American power can be used against America itself. This moral has defined the post 9/11 world: the more America uses military force in the Middle East, the more damage is done to America and Americans. The more Americans kill and terrorize Muslims, the more we recruit Muslims to become terrorists and fight against us. The war in Iraq was over in 2003 when the US forces defeated Saddam's army. Then the American occupation began an occupation by insufficient troops ill-suited to be occupiers, especially in a country on the brink of a civil war, where neither side wants us there. The number of lives lost on 9/11 is currently listed as 2973. As of this writing 2662 Americans have been sent to their deaths in Iraq, a Muslim country that did not attack us. At the current rate, within months more Americans will have been sent to their deaths by Bush than were murdered at the hands of bin Laden. 9/11 was a crime a crime against humanity and terrorism is best dealt with as crime on an international level. It is time to toss the war metaphor into the garbage can. The war metaphor is still intimidating progressives. To come out against "staying the course" is to be called unpatriotic, weak, and defeatist. To say, "no, we're just as strong, but we're smarter" is to keep and reinforce the war metaphor, which the conservatives have a patent on. It is time for progressives to jettison the war metaphor itself. It is time to tell some truths that progressives have been holding back on. What has worked in stopping terrorism is just what has worked in stopping international crime like the recent police work in England. What has failed is the war approach, which just recruits more terrorists. In Iraq, the war was over when we defeated Saddam's army. Then the occupation began. Our troops are dying because they are not trained be occupiers in hostile territory on the cusp of a civil war. Bush is an occupation president, not a war president, and his war powers should be immediately rescinded. Rep. Lynn Woolsey's resolution to do just that (H.R. 5875) should be taken seriously and made the subject of national debate. I am suggesting a conscious discussion of the war metaphor as a metaphor. The very discussion would require the nation to think of it as a metaphor, and allow the nation to take seriously the truth of our presence in Iraq as an occupation that must be ended. You don't win or lose an occupation; you just exit as gracefully as possible. Openly discussing the war metaphor as a metaphor would allow the case to be made that terrorism is most effectively treated as a crime like wiping out a crime syndicate not as an occasion for sending over a hundred thousand troops and doing massive bombing that only recruits more terrorists. Finally, openly discussing the war metaphor as a metaphor would raise the question of the domestic effect of giving the president war powers, and the fact that the Bush administration has shamelessly exploited 9/11 to achieve the political goals of the radical right with all the disasters that has brought to our country. It would allow us to name right-wing ideology, to spell it out, look at its effects, and to see what awful things it has done, is doing, and threatens to keep on doing. The blame for what has gone wrong in Iraq, in New Orleans, in our economy, and throughout the country at large should be placed squarely where it belongs on right-wing ideology that calls itself "conservative" but mocks real American values. Metaphors cannot be seen or touched, but they create massive effects, and political intimidation is one such effect. It is time for political courage and political realism. It is time to end the political intimidation of the war metaphor and the terror it has loosed on America.

#### This debate round matters – critical interrogation of our war policy and adaptation to “new wars” is critical

Kaldor 13, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, “In Defence of New Wars,” March 7, 2013, Stability, 2(1): 4, pp. 1-16, <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/download/sta.at/40%E2%80%8E>

The debate about new wars has helped to refine and reformulate the argument. The debate about Clausewitz has facilitated a more conceptual interpretation of new wars, while the debate about data has led to the identification of new sources of evidence that have helped to substantiate the main proposition. The one thing the critics tend to agree is that the new war thesis has been important in opening up new scholarly analysis and new policy perspectives, which, as I have stressed, was the point of the argument (Newman 2004; Henderson and Singer 2002). The debate has taken this further. It has contributed to the burgeoning field of conflict studies. And it has had an influence on the intensive policy debates that are taking place especially within the military, ministries of defence and international organisations the debates about counter-insurgency in the Pentagon, for example, or about human security in the European Union and indeed about non-traditional approaches to security in general. What is still lacking in the debate is the demand for a cosmopolitan political response. In the end, policing, the rule of law, justice mechanisms and institution-building depend on the spread of norms at local, national and global levels, and norms are constructed both through scholarship and public debate. If we are to reconceptualise political violence as ‘new war’ or crime and the use of force as cosmopolitan law enforcement rather than war-fighting, then we have to be able to challenge the claims of those who conceptualise political violence as ‘old war’, and this can only be done through critical publicly-engaged analysis.

#### Further, the aff doesn’t solve war – their models are outdated

Kaldor 99, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance a the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, New & Old Wars, 1999, Stanford University Press, pg 90-91

The term ‘war economy’ usually refers to a system which is centralized, totalizing and autarchic, as was the case in the total wars of the twentieth century. Administration is centralized to increase the efficiency of the war and to maximize revenue to pay for the war. As many people as possible are mobilized to participate in the war effort either as soldiers or in the production of arms arid necessities. By and large, the war effort is self-sufficient, although in World War Il, Britain and the Soviet Union received lend-lease assistance from the United States. The main aim of the war effort is to maximize the use of force so as to engage and defeat the enemy in battle. The new type of war economy is almost totally the opposite. The new wars are ‘globalized’ wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Participation is low relative to the population both because of lack of pay and because of lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties. There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support. Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions ¡s common. Those who conceive of war in traditional Clausewitzean terms, based on definable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying vested interests, both political and economic in the continuation of war. They tend to assume that political solutions can be found without any need to address the underlying economic logic. At the same time, however, those who recognize the irrelevance of traditional perceptions of war and observe the complexity of the political, social and economic relationships expressed in these wars tend to conclude that this type of violence can be equated with anarchy. In these circumstances, the most that can be done is to treat the symptoms through, for example, humanitarian assistance. In this chapter, 1 argue that it is possible to analyse the typical political economy of new wars so as to draw conclusions about possible alternative approaches. Indeed, the implication of such an analysis is that many of the well-meaning efforts of various international actors, based on inherited assumptions about the character of war, may turn out to be counterproductive. Conflict resolution from above may merely enhance the legitimacy of the warring parties and allow time for replenishment; humanitarian assistance may contribute to the functioning of the war economy; peacekeeping troops may lose legitimacy either by standing aside when terrible crimes are committed or by siding with groups who commit terrible crimes. In the first section, I describe the various fighting units typical of contemporary wars and how they have emerged out of the disintegration of the states formal security capacities. Then, I analyse patterns of violence and the character of military strategy and the way these have evolved out of the conflicts that developed during and after the Second World War as a way of reacting against or coping with modern conventional war— guerrilla warfare, cou n terinsurgency, and the low-intensity’ conflicts of the 1980s, Next, I consider how the fighting units acquire resources with which to fight the new wars and the interaction between the new pattern of violence and the social relations that are generated in the con text of war. In the final section, I describe how the new wars, or rather the social conditions of the new wars, tend to spread.

### Framework

#### That’s key to effective policymaking and solves error replication – it’s intricately tied to how policies are formulated which means they should have to defend it

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 (Paul, “From ‘ritual’ to ‘mindfulness’: policy and pedagogic positioning,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, January 2011, 32: 1, 57-69)

With such concerns, and many others in mind, it has become fashionable to describe policy in terms of discourse. Whilst by no means an agreed field (cf. Bacchi, 2000) policy as discourse does provide grounds for further consideration of the interplay between policy creation and response. As a challenge to the view that policy, as a manifestation of knowledge, arises either in the individual or in the natural world, we can consider the work of Kenneth Gergen (1995) and his proposal that all knowing arises in the social processes of language use and meaning-making. Here, rather than construe policy as the accurate expression of dispassionate, unbiased observations, such a view shifts our relationship with policy from a means by which the individual might comprehend the significance of the policy statement in terms of truth to an understanding that the language used within the policy statements itself actively constructs the world to which it pertains. Put another way, Gergen’s view invites us to consider policy as having a ‘performative’ function and that that presented is neither a true representation of reality nor an accurate reflection of intent. Accordingly, policy can no longer be simply said to be understood and applied. Alternatively, this perspective construes policy as a representation of the interplay between the policy text (the material embodiment of the policy document and associated forms), discursive practices involved in the production, distribution and consumption of policy, and wider social practices which delineate, for example ‘professional’ and, indeed, other roles and associated activities. This view acknowledges the parts played by history and culture in determining specific ways of viewing the world whilst illuminating how understanding is dependent upon prevailing social and economic arguments (after Burr, 2003). Policy, then, should not be seen as an accurate portrayal of some pre-existing status but is, rather, a social construction given legitimacy through the permission it gives to speak. Policy as discourse is, therefore, an interplay between ‘conceptual schema attached to specific historical, institutional and cultural contexts . . . [and] . . . the differential power of some actors’ (Bacchi, 2000, p. 52) to act. With this in mind, it is clear that professional actions undertaken in relation to policy appear, not as objective responses to positions of truth, but rather as subjective realisations borne out of cultural, historical, economic and social specificity. Policy as discourse attends to both the uses and effects of policy insomuch as it considers the influences pertaining to the creation of the policy text, the mechanisms by which this is imported into the professional lifeworld and the prevailing social conditions which form the very language used to describe the policy itself, as well as associated roles and identities; in short, policy as social construction. This view is not new; much has been written from this perspective. On this matter, Bacchi notes the tendency of this perspective to: Concentrate on the ability of some groups rather than others to make discourse, and on some groups rather than others as effected or constituted in discourse. To put the point briefly, those who are deemed to ‘hold’ power are portrayed as the ones making discourse, whereas those who are seen as ‘lacking’ power are described as constituted in discourse. (2000, p. 52) This redistribution of voice constitutes certain voices as meaningful or authoritative (Ball, 2006, p. 49). This social construction of policy requires an appreciation that the processes of problematisation and argumentation are the lifeblood of policy existence. The lenses offered by history, culture and economics through which ‘problems’ to be solved are identified determine not only the mechanisms by which ‘reality’ might be understood but also the very ‘problems’ themselves. Further, it is through the process of argumentation that certain solutions are presented as viable alternatives. Crucially, as Hastings (1998, p. 194) notes, this ‘highlights the instrumentality of the process of problem construction not only to successful policy making, but also to sustaining systems of belief about the nature of social reality’. Problem construction is, then, ‘as much a way of knowing and a way of acting strategically as a form of description’ (Edelman, 1988, p. 36). In this regard, policy as discourse establishes a number of key principles. First, it articulates a view that ‘problems’ do not exist as pre-human issues to be addressed but rather that they are the products of political reasoning located in economic, social, cultural and historical ways of viewing the world. Second, that these lenses also provide the means by which solutions, that is to say the pronouncements ‘captured’ as policy imperatives, might be constructed. Third, and most importantly, policy as discourse, through its recognition of cultural, historical, economic and social specificity, constrains the scope of both policy construction and policy response (Ball, 2006). Put briefly, discourse presents a variety of representations from which action might be chosen: Discourses are about what can be said, and thought, but also about who can speak, when, where and with what authority. Discourses embody the meaning and use of propositions and words. Thus certain possibilities for thought are constructed. (Ball, 2006, p. 48) This world-to-person fit describes the ‘subject position’, determined by the availability of dominant discourses. Interpretational options are thus taken to be both pre-existing and available to the subject. In such a view, human agency occurs through the deployment of the subject’s exercise of choice from the discourses available. In short, through the act of locating oneself within a frame of predetermined potentialities, the subject is said to exercise agentic action.

#### Third, we don’t preclude the 1AC or the possibility of policy focus, we just think that methodology is a prior question – means they don’t have offense. But even if they win policy simulation is good that makes the kritik more important – ethical and methodological questions are critical to avoid policy failure

McAllister et al 12 – School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering Queen’s University Belfast (Keith, with Liu Ping Hui and Stephen McKay, “Evidence and Ethics in Infrastructure Planning”, International Journal of Applied Science and Technology Vol. 2 No. 5; May 2012, dml)

Lack of transparency on matters of policymaking and decision taking raise more ethical questions than answers. There was a definitive disinclination by key respondents to answer on such matters, inferring a reluctance to engage in fearless speech (Foucault, 1983). Nonetheless, such is the importance of these questions that those who provide leadership and wield power must be cognisant of the ramifications of not upholding the ethical standards and principles of legitimacy which justify their position. The professional-political relationship in decision taking is masked in shadow, though this investigation has yielded knowledge inferring that ethical dilemmas face planning practitioners on a daily basis, albeit that most do not perceive it to be a serious issue, as one respondent put it “it‟s just part of the job”.

Such perceptions undermine the ethos upon which the profession is founded and must be redressed. Rudimentary knowledge means that only speculation is possible on the dynamic which is located at the hub of policymaking and decision taking, therefore only those interacting at the foci of power truly understand how outputs emerge from interactive discursive processes. The evidence from this investigation did, however, indicate that cognisance must not just be taken of the professional-political relationship but the professional-professional relationship in the wider planning context. While the sample is admittedly small, there is clearly an issue to address with regard to the impact of power on professional ethics. Professionals, whatever their rank, have a responsibility to dissent (Marcuse, 1976) and it is disconcerting to think that where organisational legitimacy (Tilling, 2004) is taken as read, power-laden structures (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998) may be conducive to the development of an inherent fear to express opinion as it might damage how, at best, they are perceived by their superiors or, at worst, impede career development.

While specifically testing the integrity of professional practitioners is almost impossible, it is vitally important that those who influence decisions at locations where power is wielded hold true to the ethical principles underpinning the profession. Failure to do so will ultimately lead to a catastrophic breakdown of societal approval (Kapland and Ruland, 1992) of the planning profession. Such a scenario may ultimately be conducive to the development and implementation of inappropriate policies and strategies which contribute to the demise of the environment which we strive to protect. Evidence from other jurisdictions suggests that the new infrastructure paradigm for operational practice is generally well placed to face such challenges in terms of “expertise and knowledge” (Sheridan, 2010, p. 10). The findings from this investigation suggest that commissioners and inspectors in the wider planning context are perceived as having the ethical robustness to distance themselves from challenges presented by powerbrokers; and the inherent nature of the approach is such that, unlike advocates who tactically manipulate knowledge or flagrantly misrepresent the truth, commissioners are programmed to use a balance sheet approach underpinned by impartiality (Marcuse, 1976). The task for the IPC commissioners is to remain cognisant of such ethical challenges and match the expectations achieved by their counterparts in other planning decision making arenas.

#### Fourth, the executive will redefine the law to violate and ignore the plan

Pollack, 13 -- MSU Guggenheim Fellow and professor of history emeritus [Norman, "Drones, Israel, and the Eclipse of Democracy," Counterpunch, 2-5-13, www.counterpunch.org/2013/02/05/drones-israel-and-the-eclipse-of-democracy/, accessed 9-1-13, mss]

Bisharat first addresses the transmogrification of international law by Israel’s military lawyers. We might call this damage control, were it not more serious. When the Palestinians first sought to join the I.C.C., and then, to receive the UN’s conferral of nonmember status on them, Israel raised fierce opposition. Why? He writes: “Israel’s frantic opposition to the elevation of Palestine’s status at the United Nations was motivated precisely by the fear that it would soon lead to I.C.C. jurisdiction over Palestinian claims of war crimes. Israeli leaders are unnerved for good reason. The I.C.C. could prosecute major international crimes committed on Palestinian soil anytime after the court’s founding on July 1, 2002.” In response to the threat, we see the deliberate reshaping of the law: Since 2000, “the Israel Defense Forces, guided by its military lawyers, have attempted to remake the laws of war by consciously violating them and then creating new legal concepts to provide juridical cover for their misdeeds.” (Italics, mine) In other words, habituate the law to the existence of atrocities; in the US‘s case, targeted assassination, repeated often enough, seems permissible, indeed clever and wise, as pressure is steadily applied to the laws of war. Even then, “collateral damage” is seen as unintentional, regrettable, but hardly prosecutable, and in the current atmosphere of complicity and desensitization, never a war crime. (Obama is hardly a novice at this game of stretching the law to suit the convenience of, shall we say, the national interest? In order to ensure the distortion in counting civilian casualties, which would bring the number down, as Brennan with a straight face claimed, was “zero,” the Big Lie if ever there was one, placing him in distinguished European company, Obama redefined the meaning of “combatant” status to be any male of military age throughout the area (which we) declared a combat zone, which noticeably led to a higher incidence of sadism, because it allowed for “second strikes” on funerals—the assumption that anyone attending must be a terrorist—and first responders, those who went to the aid of the wounded and dying, themselves also certainly terrorists because of their rescue attempts.) These guys play hardball, perhaps no more than in using—by report—the proverbial baseball cards to designate who would be next on the kill list. But funerals and first responders—verified by accredited witnesses–seems overly much, and not a murmur from an adoring public.

### A2 Permutation

#### The affirmative’s notion of terrorism being “solved” fails to understand the multifaceted evolution of the new wars stemming from globalization

Mohamedou, 05 (Dr. Mohammad-Mahmoud, Associate Director, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, “Non-Linearity of Engagement Transnational Armed Groups, International Law, and the Conflict between Al Qaeda and the United States,” July 2005, p2-4)

Admittedly limited and potentially a rule-proving exception, Al Qaeda’s singularity indicates, nevertheless, a genuine departure from the existing state-centered conflict paradigm. What is more, such departure is conceived, enacted, and reflected upon in a conscious and forward-looking manner by the actor itself. Therefore, “conceiving of Al Qaeda as a traditional terrorist group construct and something that can be conventionally defeated,”3 is an analytical position no longer tenable in the face of a factual assessment of the impact of this group on early twentyfirst century warfare. The current conflict between Al Qaeda and the United States illustrates vividly the evolution of warfare in three respects. First, in an effort to compensate for the disparity in logistical military capability, a non-state actor party to an international conflict has sought to expand the platform of combat, regarding disparity of forces not as a deterrent but as an opportunity. The sub-state actor is positioning itself consciously on different planes of the power continuum. Inasmuch as it no longer functions on a straightforward plane of quantitative advantage, disparity has come to imply the expansion of the panoply of means at the disposition of Al Qaeda; not merely terrorism but the full range of kinetic force to influence its enemy. Asymmetry spells, moreover, a disinclination to prosecute wars swiftly — which, from Blitzkrieg to ‘Shock and Awe,’ has been the preferred approach of states. It entails, in particular, a systematic deceleration of the use of force on the part of the non-state armed group. As Herfried Münkler noted, “asymmetrical warfare, the salient feature of the new wars in recent decades, is based to a large extent on the different velocities at which the parties wage war on each other: asymmetries of strength are based on a capacity for acceleration which outstrips that of the enemy, whereas asymmetries of weakness are based on a readiness and ability to slow down the pace of war.”5 The point deserves some emphasis that spatiotemporal non-linearity of engagement serves principally to detach the armed group from vulnerability and permanent exposure to its more powerful, lawful government enemy. Similarly, “the rule of proportionality and its related prohibitions are o􀄞en hard to discern in the way that the asymmetric and o􀄞en internal conflicts of new wars are conducted. Extremists on either side are prone, as we have seen, to contemplate the use of any means to secure their overriding purposes…. Violent acts falling outside those permi􀄴ed in war are therefore regarded as breaches of the rules of war or simply as crimes…. This implies that if we are to discern the rule of proportionality and its relations operating in new wars we must be able to regard them as properly wars, and not just outbreaks of uncontrolled violence between conflicting parties.”6 War is indeed, first and foremost, organized violence between political units. For all its novelty, far from being an aberration or an anomaly, Al Qaeda’s war is the outcome of a natural development whereby the perceived failure of particular states to act on behalf of populations and their interests has led to the coming into existence of a regional entity seeking to undertake those martial responsibilities. Cast in such light, Al Qaeda’s is a claim to circumvent statehood, and particularly its monopoly over legitimate violence. Second, a non-state armed group, whose membership transcends borders and nationality, has declared war on a state and its citizens, regarding war as retaliation to what can be termed ‘privatized collective responsibility.’ According to this argument, civilians are considered to be involved tangentially in the conflict (as accessories to the fact of perceived political hostilities). This contention marks a significant departure from the notion of ‘belligerent reprisals.’ While the later — understood as measures taken by a Party to a conflict that are otherwise unlawful but enacted in response to violations of international law by the adversary — are construed as regulated exceptions to the rule, Al Qaeda’s novel principle of indiscrimination alters the parameters of international humanitarian law and indicates its compliance limits. As Paul Gilbert notes, “whereas in old wars non-combatants and combatants hors de combat are not to be targeted because they do not, by their intentional actions, obstruct military operations to secure territory, in new wars they may be just as implicated in the supposed injustice the war is intended to rectify as are their soldiers in action.”7 The upshot of this depiction is that Al Qaeda estimates that the citizens of the states with whom it is at war bear a responsibility in the policies of their governments. This contention was stated straightforwardly in an interview granted by Osama Ben Laden to ABC journalist John Miller in May 1998: “Any American who pays taxes to his government is our target because he is helping the American war machine against the Muslim nation…. Terrorizing oppressors and criminals and thieves and robbers is necessary for the safety of the people and for the protection of their property…. They have compromised our honor and our dignity and dare we u􀄴er a single word of protest, we are called terrorists. This is compounded injustice.”8 Such democratization of responsibility and the licitness of the killing rest, it is argued, in the ability that citizens of the enemy state have to elect and dismiss the representatives which take foreign policy decisions on their behalf. In the aforementioned ABC interview, Ben Laden added: “We fight against their governments and all those who approve of the injustice they practice against us…. We fight them, and those who are part of their rule are judged in the same manner.” The argument was restated unambiguously by Ben Laden in November 2002: “By electing these leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes, and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. The American people have the ability and choice to refuse the policies of their government, yet time and again, polls show the American people support the policies of the elected government…. This is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active members in all these crimes.”9 In that sense, Al Qaeda’s strategy is one of liberalization and expansion of the domain of conflict. Equally, it renders immaterial the Arab and Islamic governments that are qualified theoretically to address these grievances, and it seeks to engage directly with the people of the states concerned, whom it considers co-responsible for their governments’ actions. On that basis, Al Qaeda claims a valid jus ad bellum case. Dismissing, in the same vein, Arab and Muslim governments (and noting the security inefficacy of their structures of authority perceived to be assisting the enemy), it sets itself as deciding war as a proper authority10 — the legitimacy of which is anchored in public support — whose just cause is a case of self-defense in the face of American “aggression” (i.e., war as punishment for the oppression of Muslims). The group affirms a right intention of restoring peace in the region. Noting the nature of American operations, it claims to be acting in proportionate response and as a last resort. Third, as a political movement with a demonstrated military ability, Al Qaeda has sought to bypass the state while co-opting strategically the latter’s attributes and channeling tactically its resources. The identity of the actors partaking of new conflicts has, in effect, mutated rendering identification more difficult. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, war occurred — two hundred and forty years ago — not between man and man, but between states. The individuals who became involved in it were, argued the Swiss philosopher, enemies only by accident.11 Contrapuntally, the leading conflict of our time takes the form of war between a major state and a group of a few thousand individuals. To be certain, the la􀄴er spring from states, which they in turn, for the most, have fought and sought to reform violently. Yet force is their ultima ratio, and legitimate force proceeds from a perceived right of self-defense which is substituted for statist decisive authority.

#### Their justification for preserving the economy engrains flawed statistical and actor analysis that will entrench inequality and violence.

Kaldor 99, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance a the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, New & Old Wars, 1999, Stanford University Press, pg 104-107

Essentially, the fragmentation and informalization of war is paralleled by the informalization of the economy. In place of the national formal economy with its emphasis on industrial production and state regulation, a new type of globalized informal economy is established in which external flows, especially hu manitarian assistance and remittances from abroad are integrated into a local and regional economy based on asset transfer and extra-legal trading. Figure 5.1 illustrates the typical resource flows of a new war. It is assumed that there ¡s no production and no taxation. Instead, external support to ordinary people, in the form of remittances and humanitarian assistance, is recycled via various forms of asset transfer and black-market trading into military resources. Direct assistance from foreign governments, protection money from producers of commodities and assist ance from the diaspora enhance the capacity of the various fight ing units to extract further resources from ordinary people and thus sustain their military efforts. Mark Dufflelci describes how this functioned in the Sudanese case where an illegal dollar trade involving Sudan, Zaire and Uganda was operated, making use of relief convoys both for trans port and to control prices: In the case of Sudan, the parallel economy Consists oía number of interconnecting levels or systems. Local asset transfer is linked to national level extra-legal mercantile activity. In turn, this ar ticulates with higher-level political and state relations together with regional and international parallel nebvorks which trade in commodities and hard currency. It is this level that provides the initial site for the integration of international aid and relief assistance with the parallel economy. As assets how upwards and outwards, culminating in capital flight, international assist ance flows downwards through the same or related systems of power.’Just as it is possible to find examples of military cooperation between fighting units so as to divide up territory or to foster mutual hatred among the respective populations, so it is possible to find examples of economic cooperation. David Keen describes what is known as the ‘sell-game’ in Sierra Leone, through which government forces sell arms and ammunition to the rebels: [Government forces] withdraw from a town, leaving arms and ammunition for the rebels behind them. The rebels pick up the arms and extract the loot, mostly in the form of cash, from the townspeople and then they themselves retreat. At this point, the government forces reoccupy the town and engage in their own looting, usually of property (which the rebels find hard to dis pose of) as well as engaging in illegal mining John Simpson describes how Peruvian government soldiers set free captured Shining Path guerrillas ‘apparently in order to per petuate insecurity in areas where officers can benefit from illegal tradIng — in this case, principally the trade in cocaine.”9 There are similar examples in the Bosnian war which I have described in chapter 3.Some writers argue that economic motivation explains the new type of warfare. David Keen suggests that a ‘war where one avoids battles but picks on unarmed civilians and perhaps eventually acquires a Mercedes may make more sense... [than] risk¡ng death in the name of the nation-state with little or no prospect of significant financial gain’.20 But economic motivation alone is insufficient to explain the scale, brutality and sheer viciousness of new wars.2’ No doubt some join the fighting as a way of legitimizing criminal activities, providing a political justification for what they do and socially sanctioning otherwise illegal methods of financial gain. No doubt there are others — rational power-seekers, extreme fanatics or victims intent on revenge — who engage in criminal activities to sustain their political military goals. Yet others are press-ganged into the fighting, propelled by fear and hunger. The point is rather that the modem distinctions between the political and the economic, the public and the private, the military and the civil are breaking down. Political control Is required to embed the new coercive forms of economic exchange, which in tum are required to provide a viable financial basis for thenew gangsters/powerholders in the context of state disintegra tion and economic marginalization. A new retrograde set of social relationships is being estabLished in which economics and violence are deeply intertwined within the shared framework of identity politics.

#### Liberalism is the new imperialism – hegemony is just an attempt to order the globalized world, crushing resistance and resulting in violence

Foster 03, (John Bellamy, co-editor of Monthly Review, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon 2k3 [“The new Age of Imperialism,” Monthly Review 55.3]

At the same time, it is clear that in the present period of global hegemonic imperialism the United States is geared above all to expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible and subordinating the rest of the capitalist world to its interests. The Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea Basin represent not only the bulk of world petroleum reserves, but also a rapidly increasing proportion of total reserves, as high production rates diminish reserves elsewhere. This has provided much of the stimulus for the United States to gain greater control of these resources--at the expense of its present and potential rivals. But U.S. imperial ambitions do not end there, since they are driven by economic ambitions that know no bounds. As Harry Magdoff noted in the closing pages of The Age of Imperialism in 1969, "it is the professed goal" of U.S. multinational corporations "to control as large a share of the world market as they do of the United States market," and this hunger for foreign markets persists today. Flo rida-based Wackenhut Corrections Corporation has won prison privatization contracts in Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands Antilles ("Prison Industry Goes Global," www.futurenet.org, fall 2000). Promotion of U.S. corporate interests abroad is one of the primary responsibilities of the U.S. state. Consider the cases of Monsanto and genetically modified food, Microsoft and intellectual property, Bechtel and the war on Iraq. It would be impossible to exaggerate how dangerous this dual expansionism of U.S. corporations and the U.S. state is to the world at large. As Istvan Meszaros observed in 2001 in Socialism or Barbarism, the U.S. attempt to seize global control, which is inherent in the workings of capitalism and imperialism, is now threatening humanity with the "extreme violent rule of the whole world by one hegemonic imperialist country on a permanent basis...an absurd and unsustainable way of running the world order."\* This new age of U.S. imperialism will generate its own contradictions, amongst them attempts by other major powers to assert their influence, resorting to similar belligerent means, and all sorts of strategies by weaker states and non-state actors to engage in "asymmetric" forms of warfare. Given the unprecedented destructiveness of contemporary weapons, which are diffused ever more widely, the consequences for the population of the world could well be devastating beyond anything ever before witnessed. Rather than generating a new "Pax Americana" the United States may be paving the way to new global holocausts. The greatest hope in these dire circumstances lies in a rising tide of revolt from below, both in the United States and globally. The growth of the antiglobalization movement, which dominated the world stage for nearly two years following the events in Seattle in November 1999, was succeeded in February 2003 by the largest global wave of antiwar protests in human history. Never before has the world's population risen up so quickly and in such massive numbers in the attempt to stop an imperialist war. The new age of imperialism is also a new age of revolt. The Vietnam Syndrome, which has so worried the strategic planners of the imperial order for decades, now seems not only to have left a deep legacy within the United States but also to have been coupled this time around with an Empire Syndrome on a much more global scale--something that no one really expected. This more than anything else makes it clear that the strategy of the American ruling class to expand the American Empire cannot possibly succeed in the long run, and will prove to be its own--we hope not the world's--undoing.

#### Their disease rhetoric entrenches false sovereignty and flawed security logic

Enemark ‘9 (Is Pandemic Flu a Security Threat? Author: Christian Enemark DOI: 10.1080/00396330902749798 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Published in: journal Survival, Volume 51, Issue 1 February 2009 , pages 191 - 214

On this point, it is worth considering why it is that military threats are traditionally accorded the highest priority among national concerns. For Barry Buzan, the answer lies in the swiftness with which the use of armed force can inflict major undesired changes. 'Military action', he writes, 'can wreck the work of centuries in all other sectors. Difficult accomplishments in politics, art, industry, culture and all human activities can be undone by the use of force.'30 More generally, for Richard Ullman, the essence of a security threat is 'an action or sequence of events that … threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state'.31 Ole Waever defines a security problem as something that can, in a particularly rapid or dramatic fashion, undercut the political order within a state, deprive it of the capacity to manage by itself, and thereby 'alter the premises for all other questions'.32 Just as states fear military conflict because so many national achievements could be quickly undone, so too an influenza pandemic would set back hardwon economic gains and potentially undermine trust in government. And like the all-consuming effort of prosecuting a war, defeating the flu would become a first-order issue for governments. This argument is reflected, for example, in the US pandemic plan which includes the statement: 'In terms of its scope, the impact of a severe pandemic may be more comparable to that of war or a widespread economic crisis than a hurricane, earthquake, or act of terrorism'.33 Defeating the flu would become a firstorder issue for governments Related to the speed of an influenza pandemic is the dread it would instil as it raised both the individual fear of infection and the collective fear of contagion. Such dread could compromise the day-to-day human interactions which sustain modern societies: civilised humankind functions and survives largely because people have contact with and depend upon one another. The US government has warned that absenteeism across multiple sectors related to personal illness, illness in family members, fear of contagion, or public health measures to limit contact with others could threaten the functioning of critical infrastructure, the movement of goods and services, and operation of institutions such as schools and universities. A pandemic would thus have significant implications for the economy, national security, and the basic functioning of society.34 A pandemic-influenza virus would produce symptoms unfamiliar to most people, and the anxiety this generated would likely be compounded by the inability of medical professionals to provide adequate treatment. By inspiring dread, pandemic influenza is arguably likely to generate a level of societal disruption disproportionate to the health burden it poses. All things being equal, any given individual is extremely unlikely to succumb to pandemic influenza, yet the gap between real and perceived risk is likely to remain as a foundation for framing the threat as a security issue.

#### Securitizing climate destroys internationalism and cooperation

Trombetta 8 (Maria Julia Trombetta is a postdoctoral re- searcher at the department of Economics of. Infrastructures, Delft University of Technology, Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse, Outh Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Number 4, December 2008)

Opponents were quick to warn that the term 'security' evokes a set of confrontational practices associated with the state and the military which should be kept apart from the environmental debate (Deudney 1990). Concerns included the possibilities of creating new competencies for the military—militarizing the environment rather than greening security (Kakonen 1994)—or the rise of nationalistic attitudes in order to protect the national environment (Deudney 1999, 466-468). Deudney argued that not only are practices and institutions associated with national security inadequate to deal with environmental problems, but security can also introduce a zero-sum rationality to the environmental debate that can create winners and losers, and undermine the cooperative efforts required by environmental problems. Similar objections came from a southern perspective: environmental security was perceived as a discourse about the security of northern countries, their access to resources and the protection of their patterns of consumption (Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001). Although the debate waxed and waned, the concept slowly gained popularity. In April 2007 the security implications of climate change were discussed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council but the state representatives remained divided over the opportunity of considering climate change and, more generally, environmental degradation as a security issue (United Nations Security Council 2007). The divide between those who oppose the use of the term environmental security by arguing that the logic of security is fixed and inflexible and those who support it by suggesting that the logic of security should be changed distracts attention away from the question of whether practices associated with providing security have been transformed by environmental security discourses. In the literature there is a debate about whether and how security language transforms the method of dealing with an issue—the debate focuses 'on the implications of using security language for the definition and governance of migration and the environment' (Huysmans 2006, 16)—but there is little on the reverse process or on the implications of using environmental language for the definition and governance of security. This article is an attempt to develop the latter type of analysis by exploring the meaning and function of environmental and climate security. The purpose is to consider how the use of a word in different contexts challenges and transforms the practices and meanings associated with it. It aims to explore 'what the practices of definition and usage do to a concept, and what the concept in turn does to the world into which it is inscribed' (Bartelson 2000,182). To undertake this analysis it is necessary to explore how different discourses about environmental and climate security have developed and 'conditioned the possibility of thought and action' (181). The article is presented in three parts. The first explores why the environment has been excluded from security considerations. By adopting a perspective that is attentive to the social construction of security issues and its implications, the article assesses the potential of a discursive approach in transforming existing security practices. The analysis draws on the theory of securitization elaborated by the Copenhagen School (inter alia Buzan and Waever 1998) and integrates it with elements borrowed from Beck's work (inter alia 1992, 1999, 2006) on risk society to provide a framework that accounts for transformation. It argues that the securitization of environmental issues can reorient security logics and practices. The second and third parts apply this framework to explore the development of environmental security and climate security discourses respectively

#### Fourth, the affirmative seeks to create a geopolitical world order while providing us with the knowledge of how to get there. Their truth claims conflate bad notions of power and knowledge that corrupts agency.

Burke, 7 (Anthony, senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence, and Reason,” Vol. 10, No. 2, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind.

#### Winning a link to their representations means they should lose – we must hold them accountable to their 1AC. Failure to do so creates an unethical, racist masculine ideology.

Patricia Hill Collins 90 (Patricia Hill, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, Former head of the Department of African American Studies at the University of Cincinnati, and the past President of the American Sociological Association Council, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment, p. 62-65)

A second component of the ethic of caring concerns the appropriateness of emotions in dialogues. Emotion indicates that a speaker believes in the validity of an argument. Consider Ntozake Shange’s description of one of the goals of her work: "Our [Western] society allows people to be absolutely neurotic and totally out of touch with their feelings and everyone else’s feelings, and yet be very respectable. This, to me, is a travesty I’m trying to change the idea of seeing emotions and intellect as distinct faculties." The Black women’s blues tradition’s history of personal expressiveness heals this either/or dichotomous rift separating emotion and intellect. For example, in her rendition of "Strange Fruit," Billie Holiday’s lyrics blend seamlessly with the emotion of her delivery to render a trenchant social commentary on southern lynching. Without emotion, Aretha Franklin’s cry for "respect" would be virtually meaningless. A third component of the ethic of caring involves developing the capacity for empathy. Harriet Jones, a 16-year-old Black woman, explains to her interviewer why she chose to open up to him: "Some things in my life are so hard for me to bear, and it makes me feel better to know that you feel sorry about those things and would change them if you could." Without her belief in his empathy, she found it difficult to talk. Black women writers often explore the growth of empathy as part of an ethic of caring. For example, the growing respect that the Black slave woman Dessa and the white woman Rufel gain for one another in Sherley Anne William’s Dessa Rose stems from their increased understanding of each other’s positions. After watching Rufel fight off the advances of a white man, Dessa lay awake thinking: "The white woman was subject to the same ravishment as me; this the thought that kept me awake. I hadn’t knowed white mens could use a white woman like that, just take her by force same as they could with us." As a result of her newfound empathy, Dessa observed, "it was like we had a secret between us." These components of the ethic of caring: the value placed on individual expressiveness, the appropriateness of emotions, and the capacity for empathy-pervade African-American culture. One of the best examples of the interactive nature of the importance of dialogue and the ethic of caring in assessing knowledge claims occurs in the use of the call-and-response discourse mode in traditional Black church services. In such services both the minister and the congregation routinely use voice rhythm and vocal inflection to convey meaning. The sound of what is being said is just as important as the words themselves in what is, in a sense, a dialogue of reason and emotion. As a result it is nearly impossible to filter out the strictly linguistic-cognitive abstract meaning from the sociocultural psychoemotive meaning. While the ideas presented by a speaker must have validity (i.e., agree with the general body of knowledge shared by the Black congregation), the group also appraises the way knowledge claims are presented. There is growing evidence that the ethic of caring may be part of women’s experience as well. Certain dimensions of women’s ways of knowing bear striking resemblance to Afrocentric expressions of the ethic of caring. Belenky et al. point out that two contrasting epistemological orientations characterize knowing: one an epistemology of separation based on impersonal procedures for establishing truth and the other, an epistemology of connection in which truth emerges through care. While these ways of knowing are not gender specific, disproportionate numbers of women rely on connected knowing. The emphasis placed on expressiveness and emotion in African-American communities bears marked resemblance to feminist perspectives on the importance of personality in connected knowing. Separate knowers try to subtract the personality of an individual from his or her ideas because they see personality as biasing those ideas. In contrast, connected knowers see personality as adding to an individual’s ideas and feel that the personality of each group member enriches a group’s understanding. The significance of individual uniqueness, personal expressiveness, and empathy in African-American communities thus resembles the importance that some feminist analyses place on women’s "inner voice." The convergence of Afrocentric and feminist values in the ethic of caring seems particularly acute. White women may have access to a women’s tradition valuing emotion and expressiveness, but few Eurocentric institutions except the family validate this way of knowing. In contrast, Black women have long had the support of the Black church, an institution with deep roots in the African past and a philosophy that accepts and encourages expressiveness and an ethic of caring. Black men share in this Afrocentric tradition. But they must resolve the contradictions that confront them in searching for Afrocentric models of masculinity in the face of abstract, unemotional notions of masculinity imposed on them. The differences among race/gender groups thus hinge on differences in their access to institutional supports valuing one type of knowing over another. Although Black women may be denigrated within white-male-controlled academic institutions, other institutions, such as Black families and churches, which encourage the expression of Black female power, seem to do so, in part, by way of their support for an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. The Ethic of Personal Accountability An ethic of personal accountability is the final dimension of an alternative epistemology. Not only must individuals develop their knowledge claims through dialogue and present them in a style proving their concern for their ideas, but people are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims. Zilpha Elaw’s description of slavery reflects this notion that every idea has an owner and that the owner’s identity matters: "Oh, the abominations of slavery! ... Every case of slavery, however lenient its infliction and mitigated its atrocities, indicates an oppressor, the oppressed, and oppression." For Elaw abstract definitions of slavery mesh with the concrete identities of its perpetrators and its victims. African-Americans consider it essential for individuals to have personal positions on issues and assume full responsibility for arguing their validity. Assessments of an individual’s knowledge claims simultaneously evaluate an individual’s character, values, and ethics. African-Americans reject the Eurocentric, masculinist belief that probing into an individual’s personal viewpoint is outside the boundaries of discussion. Rather, all views expressed and actions taken are thought to derive from a central set of core beliefs that cannot be other than personal. "Does Aretha really believe that Black women should get ‘respect, or is she just mouthing the words?" is a valid question in an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. Knowledge claims made by individuals respected for their moral and ethical connections to their ideas will carry more weight than those offered by less respected figures. An example drawn from an undergraduate course composed entirely of Black women which I taught might help to clarify the uniqueness of this portion of the knowledge validation process. During one class discussion I asked the students to evaluate a prominent Black male scholar’s analysis of Black feminism. Instead of severing the scholar from his context in order to dissect the rationality of his thesis, my students demanded facts about the author’s personal biography. They were especially interested in concrete details of his life, such as his relationships with Black women, his marital status, and his social class background. By requesting data on dimensions of his personal life routinely excluded in positivist approaches to knowledge validation, they invoked concrete experience as a criterion of meaning. They used this information to assess whether he really cared about his topic and drew on this ethic of caring in advancing their knowledge claims about his work. Furthermore, they refused to evaluate the rationality of his written ideas without some indication of his personal credibility as an ethical human being. The entire exchange could only have occurred as a dialogue among members of a class that had established a solid enough community to employ an alternative epistemology in assessing knowledge claims. The ethic of personal accountability is clearly an Afrocentric value, but is it feminist as well? While limited by its attention to middle-class, white women, Carol Gilligan’s work suggests that there is a female model for moral development whereby women are more inclined to link morality to responsibility, relationships, and the ability to maintain social ties. If this is the case, then African-American women again experience a convergence of values from Afrocentric and female institutions. The use of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology in traditional Black church services illustrates the interactive nature of all four dimensions and also serves as a metaphor for the distinguishing features of an Afrocentric feminist way of knowing. The services represent more than dialogues between the rationality used in examining bible texts and stories and the emotion inherent in the use of reason for this purpose. The rationale for such dialogues involves the task of examining concrete experiences for the presence of an ethic of caring. Neither emotion nor ethics is subordinated to reason. Instead, emotion, ethics, and reason are used as interconnected, essential components in assessing knowledge claims. In an Afrocentric feminist epistemology, values lie at the heart of the knowledge validation process such that inquiry always has an ethical aim. Alternative knowledge claims in and of themselves are rarely threatening to conventional knowledge. Such claims are routinely ignored, discredited, or simply absorbed and marginalized in existing paradigms, Much more threatening is the challenge that alternative epistemologies offer to he basic process used by the powerful to legitimate their knowledge claims. If the epistemology used to validate knowledge comes into question, then all prior knowledge claims validated under the dominant model become suspect. An alternative epistemology challenges all certified knowledge and opens up the question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative ways of validating truth. The existence of a self-defined Black women’s standpoint using an Afrocentric feminist epistemology calls into question the content of what currently passes as truth and simultaneously challenges the process of arriving at the truth.

## 1NR

### **Overview**

#### **Reform’s key to heg – Stability solves their terrorism arguments**

Nye 12. [Joseph S., a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye]

CAMBRIDGE – The United States is a nation of immigrants. Except for a small number of Native Americans, everyone is originally from somewhere else, and even recent immigrants can rise to top economic and political roles. President Franklin Roosevelt once famously addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution – a group that prided itself on the early arrival of its ancestors – as “fellow immigrants.”¶ In recent years, however, US politics has had a strong anti-immigration slant, and the issue played an important role in the Republican Party’s presidential nomination battle in 2012. But Barack Obama’s re-election demonstrated the electoral power of Latino voters, who rejected Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney by a 3-1 majority, as did Asian-Americans.¶ As a result, several prominent Republican politicians are now urging their party to reconsider its anti-immigration policies, and plans for immigration reform will be on the agenda at the beginning of Obama’s second term. Successful reform will be an important step in preventing the decline of American power.¶ Fears about the impact of immigration on national values and on a coherent sense of American identity are not new. The nineteenth-century “Know Nothing” movement was built on opposition to immigrants, particularly the Irish. Chinese were singled out for exclusion from 1882 onward, and, with the more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, immigration in general slowed for the next four decades.¶ During the twentieth century, the US recorded its highest percentage of foreign-born residents, 14.7%, in 1910. A century later, according to the 2010 census, 13% of the American population is foreign born. But, despite being a nation of immigrants, more Americans are skeptical about immigration than are sympathetic to it. Various opinion polls show either a plurality or a majority favoring less immigration. The recession exacerbated such views: in 2009, one-half of the US public favored allowing fewer immigrants, up from 39% in 2008.¶ Both the number of immigrants and their origin have caused concerns about immigration’s effects on American culture. Demographers portray a country in 2050 in which non-Hispanic whites will be only a slim majority. Hispanics will comprise 25% of the population, with African- and Asian-Americans making up 14% and 8%, respectively.¶ But mass communications and market forces produce powerful incentives to master the English language and accept a degree of assimilation. Modern media help new immigrants to learn more about their new country beforehand than immigrants did a century ago. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that the latest immigrants are assimilating at least as quickly as their predecessors.¶ While too rapid a rate of immigration can cause social problems, over the long term, immigration strengthens US power. It is estimated that at least 83 countries and territories currently have fertility rates that are below the level needed to keep their population constant. Whereas most developed countries will experience a shortage of people as the century progresses, America is one of the few that may avoid demographic decline and maintain its share of world population.¶ For example, to maintain its current population size, Japan would have to accept 350,000 newcomers annually for the next 50 years, which is difficult for a culture that has historically been hostile to immigration. In contrast, the Census Bureau projects that the US population will grow by 49% over the next four decades.¶ Today, the US is the world’s third most populous country; 50 years from now it is still likely to be third (after only China and India). This is highly relevant to economic power: whereas nearly all other developed countries will face a growing burden of providing for the older generation, immigration could help to attenuate the policy problem for the US.¶ In addition, though studies suggest that the short-term economic benefits of immigration are relatively small, and that unskilled workers may suffer from competition**,** skilled immigrants can be important to particular sectors – and to long-term growth. There is a strong correlation between the number of visas for skilled applicants and patents filed in the US. At the beginning of this century, Chinese- and Indian-born engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, which accounted for $17.8 billion in sales; and, in 2005, immigrants had helped to start one-quarter of all US technology start-ups during the previous decade. Immigrants or children of immigrants founded roughly 40% of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies.¶ Equally important are immigration’s benefits for America’s soft power. The fact that people want to come to the US enhances its appeal, and immigrants’ upward mobility is attractive to people in other countries. The US is a magnet, and many people can envisage themselves as Americans, in part because so many successful Americans look like them. Moreover, connections between immigrants and their families and friends back home help to convey accurate and positive information about the US.¶ Likewise, because the presence of many cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries, it helps to broaden Americans’ attitudes and views of the world in an era of globalization. Rather than diluting hard and soft power, immigration enhances both.¶ Singapore’s former leader, Lee Kwan Yew, an astute observer of both the US and China, argues that China will not surpass the US as the leading power of the twenty-first century, precisely because the US attracts the best and brightestfrom the rest of the world and melds them into a diverse culture of creativity. China has a larger population to recruit from domestically, but, in Lee’s view, its Sino-centric culture will make it less creative than the US.¶ That is a view that Americans should take to heart. If Obama succeeds in enacting immigration reform in his second term, he will have gone a long way toward fulfilling his promise to maintain the strength of the US.

#### Reform controls the internal link to the economy – more jobs, innovation, and market demand.

Krudy 13. [Edward, correspondent, "Analysis: Immigration reform could boost U.S. economic growth" Reuters -- January 29 -- www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/29/us-usa-economyimmigration-idUSBRE90S06R20130129]

The sluggish U.S. economy could get a lift if President Barack Obama and a bipartisan group of senators succeed in what could be the biggest overhaul of the nation's immigration system since the 1980s.¶ Relaxed immigration rules could encourage entrepreneurship, increase demand for housing, raise tax revenues and help reduce the budget deficit, economists said.¶ By helping more immigrants enter the country legally and allowing many illegal immigrants to remain, the United States could help offset a slowing birth rate and put itself in a stronger demographic position than aging Europe, Japan and China.¶ "Numerous industries in the United States can't find the workers they need, right now even in a bad economy, to fill their orders and expand their production as the market demands," said Alex Nowrasteh, an immigration specialist at the libertarian Cato Institute.¶ The emerging consensus among economists is that immigration provides a net benefit. It increases demand and productivity, helps drive innovation and lowers prices, although there is little agreement on the size of the impact on economic growth.¶ President Barack Obama plans to launch his second-term push for a U.S. immigration overhaul during a visit to Nevada on Tuesday and will make it a high priority to win congressional approval of a reform package this year, the White House said.¶ The chances of major reforms gained momentum on Monday when a bipartisan group of senators agreed on a framework that could eventually give 11 million illegal immigrants a chance to become American citizens.¶ Their proposals would also include means to keep and attract workers with backgrounds in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. This would be aimed both at foreign students attending American universities where they are earning advanced degrees and high-tech workers abroad.¶ An estimated 40 percent of scientists in the United States are immigrants and studies show immigrants are twice as likely to start businesses, said Nowrasteh.¶ Boosting legal migration and legalizing existing workers could add $1.5 trillion to the U.S. economy over the next 10 years, estimates Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, a specialist in immigration policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. That's an annual increase of 0.8 percentage points to the economic growth rate, currently stuck at about 2 percent.

#### Solves US-India relations --- builds trade relationships

LA Times 12, 11/9/2012 (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"**C**omprehensive **i**mmigration **r**eform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China."¶ There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said.¶ "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### That turns middle east and indo-pak terrorism

Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, July. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7. InformaWorld.)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability

### Uniqueness

#### CIR will pass now – Business lobby and the GOP give it momentum

Fox News Latino 1/9/14 (Is 2014 The Year for Immigration Reform? Republicans, Chamber of Commerce Spar")

Conservatives and the nation's biggest business lobby sparred Wednesday over immigration overhaul, with advocates vowing a renewed effort to get the House to act this year and opponents digging in against anything that shifts the political spotlight from President Barack Obama's troubled health care law.¶ The latest skirmish came as proponents raised expectations of congressional action on the contentious issue, seizing on any glimmer of positive developments. House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, told rank-and-file Republicans in a closed-door session that he would soon outline party principles on the issue, which could serve as a precursor to legislation.¶ One of the GOP's crucial backers on many policies, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, promised to "pull out all the stops" to get legislation done.

#### CIR will pass – Boehner and the GOP are getting on board –

Irwin 1/15/14 (John, U.S. Immigration Reform Legislation Could Become Reality in 2014")

Prospects for the passage of comprehensive immigration reform on Capitol Hill are looking up, after years of inaction on the issue.¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, indicated he might back limited, separate reforms to the United States’ immigration system. While President Barack Obama and Democratic leaders have pushed for a single, broad immigration package, Obama would likely sign smaller reforms into law as he looks to make good on a promise and gain momentum following a politically brutal 2013.¶ Boehner’s potential pivot on immigration might be in recognition of an increasingly diverse electorate ahead of this year’s midterms and the 2016 presidential election. Bucking tea party allies, several top Republicans see reform as vital to winning over Latino voters, 71 percent of whom voted for Obama in 2012, according to the [Pew Research Center](http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election/).

#### Obama is pushing and its top priority

Martinez 1/9/14 (Guillermo, South Florida, Sun Sentinel, "Guillermo Martinez: Congress Must Act Quickly for Immigration Reform")

Only hours after having brushed off the snow from the worst storm in decades, Republican congressmen and senators reconvened in Washington and were soon busy trying to determine if they were ready to pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill.¶ Unless this issue is resolved quickly, it will die an ignominious death to the reality of the November mid-term elections¶ President Barack Obama is pushing for it. After a disastrous 2013, he wants to change the agenda away from discussion of his Affordable Care Act, and immigration reform is one way to make Republicans uncomfortable.

### Link

#### Debates about drones cost capital – they cause massive fracturing in the GOP

Rothman 3/7/13 (Noah, Editor at Mediaite, "Lindsey Graham Slams Rand Paul, GOP'ers Cheering Him: Paul's Position On Drones Not a 'Republican View')

Joining Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) objection to Sen. Rand Paul’s (R-KY) filibuster of President Barack Obama’s nominee to become the next CIA director, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) slammed Paul and the members of his party who cheered his filibuster. Graham said that Paul’s position on drones is not a “Republican view,” and he is “disappointed” in his fellow Republicans for supporting Paul’s opposition towards Obama administration’s drone policy. ¶ “To my Republican colleagues, I don’t remember any of you coming down here suggesting that President [George W.] Bush was going to kill anybody with a drone,” Graham said. He added that even Democrats never accused Bush of wanting to assassinate Americans with a drone.¶ “What is it, all of the sudden, that this drone program has gotten every Republican all spun up?” Graham asked. He said that many are “astonished” that Obama has continued President Bush’s war on terror. “I’m not astonished, I congratulate him for having the good judgment to understand we’re at war,” Graham added.¶ “To my party, I’m a bit disappointed that you no longer apparently think we’re at war,” he observed. “Not Senator Paul, he’s a man to himself. He has a view that I don’t think is a Republican view – I think it’s a legitimately held libertarian view.”¶

#### The plan would take on all of the republican leadership

Rayfield 2/11/13 (Jillian, Assistant News Editor for Salon, Focusing on Politics, Salon Online, "Congress Takes Sides on Drones")

Unconditional Defenders: House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., called the use of drones “a lawful act of national self-defense” in an initial statement last week, and argued on Sunday that the program already has enough oversight. “Monthly I have my committee go to the CIA to review them. I as chairman review every single airstrike we use in the war on terror, both on the civilian and the military side when it comes to terrorist strikes,” he said. “There’s plenty of oversight here.”¶ During a [press conference](http://livewire.talkingpointsmemo.com/entry/boehner-onboard-with-revealed-obama-drone-memo) on Feb. 6, House Speaker John Boehner agreed with Rogers’ initial statement that the use of drones is legal and necessary. “That’s all,” Boehner said.¶ “The process of being targeted I think is legal, quite frankly laborious and should reside in the commander in chief to determine who an enemy combatant is and what kind of force to use,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who [went so far](http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-congress/2013/02/graham-defends-obama-on-drones-156263.html) as to call the drone program one of the “highlights” of Obama’s presidency so far.¶ “If you take up arms against America and you fight in a terrorist training camp or on the front lines in Pakistan or Afghanistan or Yemen, you shouldn’t be surprised if America reaches out and exacts justice against you,” said Rep. Tom Cotton, R-Ark.¶ Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., dismissed the “liberal hand-wringing” over the program. “I fully support targeted operations that have been carried out,” he said in a recent [appearance](http://www.mediaite.com/tv/gop-rep-peter-king-dismisses-concerns-about-drone-warfare-so-much-liberal-hand-wringing/) on MSNBC. “I think the president has done the right thing.”¶ Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said an oversight panel would be “an encroachment on the powers of the president of the United States.” He added that he does take issue with the program being in “the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency,” when it should reside within the Department of Defense. “Since when is the intelligence agency supposed to be an air force of drones that goes around killing people? I believe that it’s a job for the Department of Defense.”

### Push

#### Obama is pushing and its top priority

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